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ABSTRACT
TWO ESSAYS ON INVESTOR ATTENTION AND ASSET PRICING
Nadia Asmaa Nafar
Old Dominion University, 2015
Director: Dr. Kenneth Yung

This dissertation explores the effect of investor attention, as measured by Google
Search Volume Index, on security prices. It seeks to answer the following research
questions: 1) what is the effect of investor attention on the expected returns of EREITs?
And 2) what is the impact of investor attention on the open market repurchases post
announcement returns?
Classic theory suggests that information is immediately incorporated into stock
prices. However, existing empirical evidence shows that investors are limited in terms of
the amount of information they can process. Kahneman (1973) advances that attention is
a scarce cognitive resource. Individuals suffer from bounded rationality. When faced with
large amounts of information, they are limited in terms of how much they can process.
This implies that prices may not reflect all available information due to limited investor
attention.
Essay 1 investigates the effect of investor attention on the expected returns of
EREITs. The attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) suggests that increased
attention leads to increased buying, which pushes prices and returns higher temporarily,
but is followed by a reversal. We test the attention hypothesis on EREITs from 2004 to
2012 using Search Volume Index (SVI) data in Google Trends. We find that EREITs
that generate high investor attention, as measured by SVI, earn higher returns compared
to EREITs that generate no investor attention. The results are driven by small stocks and
stocks with high book to market ratio. We report that the SVI effect is not due to
impediments to trade and conjecture that SVI increases investor recognition among
EREITs that are characterized by information incompleteness, leading to higher returns.
Over time, this increase in returns is followed by a reversal.
Essay 2 uses the attention hypothesis to generate insights into stock repurchases
price drift. Using a sample of 318 firms that made repurchase announcements between
2004 and 2008 and which have weekly search volume data in Google Trends, we find
that investor attention has an effect on the repurchase drift for stocks during the first year
following the announcement. More specifically, high abnormal search volume leads to a
positive effect on cumulative returns during the first year following the announcement for
small stocks, stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, low market to book ratio, and low past

return. Prior research has shown that for such stocks, the repurchase drift lasts for three
years due to limits to arbitrage. As these stocks are dominated by retail investors, an
increase in retail investors’ attention results in increased buying, which pushes prices and
cumulative returns higher. Low abnormal search volume signals a decrease in investor
attention and results in negative returns among all stocks. The results provide further
support to the attention hypothesis.
Both essays find evidence that the level of investor attention has an effect on
security prices. This is contrary to the predictions of the classical theory that postulates
that information is immediately incorporated into stock prices.
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INTRODUCTION

According to the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices reflect all available
information (Fama 1970). However, the existing empirical evidence has documented
several instances where this hypothesis was violated. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and
Vermaelen (1995) document stock price under-reaction following open market
repurchase announcements. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) find evidence of under
reaction to earnings announcements as well as momentum effects. Michaely, Thaler and
Womack (1995) document evidence of drift following dividend initiations and omissions.
Similarly, Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) find evidence of drift following stock
splits.
Kahneman (1973) suggests that attention is a scarce cognitive resource.
Individuals have bounded rationality. When faced with large amounts of information,
they are limited in terms of how much they can process. Consequently, they must be
selective about the type of inform ation to which they can dedicate their attention. This

implies that limited investor attention may be the driver behind the slow incorporation of
information into stock prices.
Several studies have examined the effect of investor attention on asset pricing.
For example, Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2012) find that stocks that Jim Cramer
mentions in his popular CNBC TV show Mad Money earn significantly positive
overnight returns. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) report that, in the case of IPOs,
increased attention results in high abnormal returns in the first two weeks and the effect is
reversed in one year. Tetlock (2011) reports that stale news result in temporary price
movements among stocks dominated by individual investors. DellaVigna and Pollet
(2009) find that investor inattention is high on Fridays. Earnings announcements made
on Fridays have a 15% lower immediate response and a 70% higher delayed response.
Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) document that investor inattention increases on days
crowded with earnings announcements. As a result, the immediate price response to
earnings surprises is weaker and the post-earnings announcement drift is stronger. Fang
and Peress (2009) suggest that investors’ limited attention is behind the finding that
stocks highly covered by mass media have lower returns than stocks not covered by the
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media, controlling for other risk factors. Barber and Odean (2008) postulate that
individuals are net-buyers of attention grabbing stocks. Individuals only buy the stocks
that catch their attention, which has repercussions on security pricing.
This thesis investigates the role that investor attention plays in explaining the
pricing o f EREITs and the open market repurchases post announcement price drift. Essay
1 examines the impact of investor attention on the expected returns of EREITs. It is
important to consider this research question for several reasons. Recent studies report
evidence suggesting that investor attention has an effect on common stocks. REITs are
considered to be a “distinct asset” class. As a result, existing research examining the
effect o f investor attention on stock returns excludes REITs from their sample (Barber
and Odean (2008), Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009), Chemmanur and Yan (2009), and Da et
al (2011)). We contribute to the literature by examining the effect of investor attention
on EREITs returns. We focus on EREITs as they comprise the majority of REITs
publicly traded. In addition, we use a novel and direct proxy of retail investor attention,
w hich is G oogle’s Search V olum e Index (SVI). SVI is considered an appropriate m easure

of retail investor attention. Given that EREITs behave like small stocks and are
characterized by information opaqueness (Damodaran and Liu (1993), Danielsen and
Harrison (2000) and Devos, Ong, and Spieler (2007)), they are more likely to attract
retail investors (Barber and Odean (2008)). EREITs’ limited information dissemination
and lack of transparency provide an appropriate setting to directly test the effect of
investor attention on returns.
Essay 2 explores the impact of investor attention on the open market repurchases
post announcement returns. Addressing this research question is important for several
reasons. First, post repurchase price drift has not been studied from the perspective of
investor attention. Most studies examine the link between under-reaction and the
attention hypothesis in the context of earnings (Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Hirshleifer,
Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004), Hou and Moskowitz (2005), Cohen and Frazzini (2008),
Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2008), Hirshleifer et al 2009, and DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)).
The impact of attention on returns following stocks buybacks is lacking. Second, under
reaction is stronger among firms characterized by high idiosyncratic risk (Ikenberry et al
(1995)). Such mispricing persists due to limits to arbitrage that result from high
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idiosyncratic risk (Pontiff (2006), Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Gromb and Vayanos (2002),
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), and Doukas, Kim, and
Pantzalis (2010)). This paper seeks to identify the impact that investor attention has on
the post repurchase price drift given different levels of limits to arbitrage and
idiosyncratic risk. Finally, this paper adds to the existing literature by using a novel and
direct proxy of individual investor attention; Google’s SVI (Da et al 2011).
Both essays use SVI to proxy for investor attention. SVI represents a term’s total
number of searches scaled by its time-series average and is produced weekly using
Google’s aggregate search frequency. Given that search is a measure of attention and
that Google is a commonly used search engine, its reported search logs are likely to be
representative of that of the entire population and, as a result, appropriate in measuring
investor attention (Da et al 2011). SVI is also considered a proxy that is specific to retail
investors because they are likely to use the internet to obtain financial information (Da et
al 2011). More sophisticated institutional investors use information services such as
Reuters and B loom berg term inals. SVI is obtained using each com pany’s ticker symbol

(Da et al 2011). This allows accounting for search logs made for financial and
investment purposes. In addition, all SVI reports are obtained from the Finance Category
in Google Trends to reduce noise.
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CHAPTER 1
INVESTOR ATTENTION AND THE EXPECTED RETURNS OF EREITS

ABSTRACT

This study investigates the effect of investor attention on the expected returns of
EREITs. The attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) suggests that increased
attention leads to increased buying, which pushes prices and returns higher temporarily,
but is followed by a reversal. We test the attention hypothesis on EREITs from 2004 to
2012 using Search Volume Index (SVI) data in Google Trends. We find that EREITs
that generate high investor attention, as measured by SVI, earn higher returns compared
to EREITs that generate no investor attention. The results are driven by small stocks and
stocks with high book to market ratio. We report that the SVI effect is not due to
impediments to trade and conjecture that SVI increases investor recognition among
EREITs that are characterized by information incompleteness, leading to higher returns.
Over time, this increase in returns is followed by a reversal.

INTRODUCTION
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are investment tools used to facilitate
investor participation in the real estate market; as directly investing in this market can be
costly in terms of resources and information. REITs are closed- end investment
companies that are traded like stocks. These stocks have gained increased popularity in
the last two decades as they are used as tools for diversification (Goetzmann and
Ibbotson, 1990), are liquid (Han and Liang 1995), and constitute an economic way to
purchase real estate due to the reduction in transaction and information costs they provide
(Ghosh, Miles and Sirmans (1996)).
According to the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts’
(NAREIT) website1, there were 202 USA publicly traded REITs with a market
1 http://w w w .reit.com /nareit

5

capitalization of over $670 billion at the end of 2013. Two major categories comprise the
REITs market. These are Equity REITs (EREITs) and Mortgage REITs (MREITs).
EREITs are real estate investment companies that generate their income from rent.
MREITs are real estate investment companies that generate their revenue from interest
earned from mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities. EREITs constitute the
majority o f these publicly traded REITS with a total of 161 publicly traded stocks and a
total market capitalization of over $608 billion as of the end of 2013.
Classic theory suggests that information is immediately incorporated into stock
prices. However, existing empirical evidence shows that investors are limited in terms of
the amount of information they can process. Kahneman (1973) reports that attention is a
scarce cognitive resource. Prices, therefore, may not reflect all available information due
to limited investor attention.
Recent studies report evidence suggesting that investor attention has an effect on
common stocks. REITs are considered to be a “distinct asset” class. As a result, existing
research examining the effect of investor attention on stock returns excludes REITs from
their sample (Barber and Odean (2008), Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009), Chemmanur and
Yan (2009), Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011)). We contribute to the literature by
examining the effect of investor attention on EREITs returns. We focus on EREITs as
they comprise the majority of REITs publicly traded. In addition, we use a novel and
direct proxy o f retail investor attention, which is Google’s Search Volume Index (SVI).
SVI is considered an appropriate measure of retail investor attention. Given that EREITs
behave like small stocks and are characterized by information opaqueness (Damodaran
and Liu (1993), Danielsen and Harrison (2000) and Devos, Ong, and Spieler (2007)),
they are more likely to attract retail investors (Barber and Odean (2008)). EREITs’
limited information dissemination and lack of transparency provide an appropriate setting
to directly test the effect o f investor attention on returns.
We find that SVI is a unique measure of investor attention among EREITs and
does not merely reflect other investor attention measures, such as trading volume, analyst
coverage, or excess returns. We also find that EREITs that attract high investor attention,
as measured by SVI, generate higher returns than EREITs with no investor attention. The
univariate analysis shows that average returns are especially higher for the EREITs that
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are small, with high book to market ratio, low past month return, low price, and are
highly illiquid.
The SVI effect is explained by the Attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean
(2008). The hypothesis posits that individual investors are net-buyers of “attentiongrabbing” stocks. Prior to buying, investors consider a set of stocks they research and to
which they devote attention. When buying, they choose from this set o f stocks. However,
when selling, they can only sell what they already own. The attention hypothesis
proposes that increased attention leads to increased buying, which temporarily pushes
prices higher and results in higher returns. Over the long-term, this price pressure is
reversed. Da et al (2011) reports that in the case of IPOs, increased attention results in
high abnormal returns in the first two weeks and the effect is reversed in one year.
Controlling for risk factors using the CAPM, the Fama-French (1993) three-factor
model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, we find that increased investor attention
results in higher average returns among stocks that are small and with high book to
market ratio. To ensure that the SVI effect is not spurious, we investigate whether
impediments to trade are behind the effect. The impediments-to-trade hypothesis
suggests that limits to arbitrage, due to severe market frictions, cause mispricing to
persist. As a result, the SVI effect may be due to illiquidity and lack o f professional
investors’ involvement. Our findings suggest that the SVI effect is not explained by
impediments to trade. Using illiquidity proxies, such as Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity
ratio, the dollar trading volume, and price, we find insignificant profits among highly
illiquid stocks. We conclude that although the SVI effect is strong among small stocks,
we find no support that the effect is due to impediments to trade.
Rather, the SVI effect is due to improvement in investor recognition. Merton’s
(1987) investor recognition hypothesis suggests that in markets with incomplete
information, investors are not aware of all securities. As a result, a stock that has low
investor recognition needs to offer higher returns to compensate its holders for being
imperfectly diversified. Lehavy and Sloan (2008) explain that investor recognition
increases returns over the short term, but decreases expected returns over the long run.
We find that SVI improves investor recognition among stocks with no analyst coverage
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and poor information dissemination and results in higher returns. Over time, however,
the positive effect of SVI on returns is reversed.
Finally, controlling for alternative measures of attention, we find that SVI has a
positive and significant effect on excess returns. Splitting the sample between EREITs
with no analyst coverage and those with analyst coverage, we find that the effect is driven
by stocks with no analyst coverage. We conclude that SVI improves investor recognition
among stocks that suffer from poor information dissemination and high information
incompleteness, which results in high excess returns. This lends support to the Attention
hypothesis o f Barber and Odean (2008) and Merton’s (1987) investor recognition
hypothesis. The results also support the assertion that EREITs behave similarly to
common stocks.
The remainder o f the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the
literature review. Sample description and data are described in Section II. Section III
summarizes the findings. The final section concludes the paper.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Our paper relates to two strands of literature. It contributes to the strand of
literature that examines the effect of investor attention on stock returns and to the
literature that investigates the determinants of REITs returns.
According to the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices reflect all available
information (Fama 1970). This hypothesis, however, is challenged by the argument that
investors have limited attention. Kahneman (1973) suggests that attention is a scarce
cognitive resource. Individuals have bounded rationality. When faced with large
amounts o f information, they are limited in terms of how much they can process.
Consequently, they must be selective about the type of information to which they can
dedicate their attention.
Several studies have examined the effect of investor attention on asset pricing.
Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2012) find that stocks that Jim Cramer mentions in
his popular CNBC TV show Mad Money earn significantly positive overnight returns.
Da et al (2011) report that, in the case of IPOs, increased attention results in high
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abnormal returns in the first two weeks and the effect is reversed in one year. Tetlock
(2011) reports that stale news result in temporary price movements among stocks
dominated by individual investors. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) find that investor
inattention is high on Fridays. Earnings announcements made on Fridays have a 15%
lower immediate response and a 70% higher delayed response. Hirshleifer, Lim and
Teoh (2009) document that investor inattention increases on days crowded with earnings
announcements. As a result, the immediate price response to earnings surprises is weaker
and the post-earnings announcement drift is stronger. Fang and Peress (2009) suggest
that investors’ limited attention is behind the finding that stocks highly covered by mass
media have lower returns than stocks not covered by the media, controlling for other risk
factors. Barber and Odean (2008) postulate that individuals are net-buyers of attention
grabbing stocks. Individuals only buy the stocks that catch their attention, which has
repercussions on security pricing. Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2008) provide evidence that
price under-reaction to earnings news weakens with increased investor attention while
over-reaction strengthens with increased investor attention. Cohen and Frazzini (2008)

find that there is return predictability among firms that are economically linked, which
suggests that investor inattention exists. Hou and Moskowitz (2005) report that limited
investor recognition is associated with the delay in the incorporation of information into
stock prices. Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) find evidence that investors’ high
attention to accounting profitability compared to cash profitability results in the former
predicting long-term returns. Huberman and Regev (2001) report the case of a
pharmaceutical firm called EntreMed whose price soared following the publication of the
news story that the company is potentially developing cancer cure drugs in the New York
Times. The news, however, was stale as it was already published in the journal Nature
and other media outlets five month earlier but received no attention.
We contribute to the literature on investor attention by using a novel and direct
proxy of individual investor attention. We use Google’s Search Volume Index (SVI)
obtained from Google Trends (http://www.google.com/trendsl. SVI represents a term’s
total number of searches scaled by its time-series average and is produced weekly using
Google’s aggregate search frequency. It is a direct measure of attention because
investors only search those stocks that they pay attention to. SVI is considered an
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investor measure specific to retail investors. Institutional investors do not use Google to
get information. Instead, they have access to more sophisticated information services,
such as Reuters and Bloomberg terminals and are not as limited in terms of attention as
they devote significant amount of time and energy to research stocks.
Prior studies have used different proxies to measure investor attention. They
include trading volume (Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001), Barber and Odean
(2008), and Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2008)), advertising expenditures (Chemmanur and
Yan (2009)), Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004), and Lou (2014)), prior excess returns
(Barber and Odean (2008), price limits (Seasholes and Wu (2007), and news media
coverage ((Barber and Odean (2008), Yuan (2008), and Fang and Peress (2009)). Da et al
(2011) propose that such proxies are indirect measures of investor attention. They argue
that these measures involve the assumption that appearance in the media, an increase in
trading volume, or high excess returns are automatically linked to investor attention.
However, an increase in trading volume or high returns may be due to other factors
besides investor attention. Huberm an and Regev (2001) assert that though a firm may

appear in the media, increased investor attention is not guaranteed. Cohen and Frazzini
(2008) report that investors are often overw helm ed by the am ount o f inform ation reported
in the media and they cannot effectively process it.
This paper is also related to the literature that investigates the determinants of
REITs returns. One strand of this literature uses market factors and firm characteristics
to explain the returns of REITs. Findings suggest that REITs behave like small
capitalization stocks (Chan, Hendershott, and Sanders (1990), Han and Liang (1995) and
Peterson and Hsieh (1997)), that they behave similarly to a portfolio composed of stocks
and bonds (Sanders (1998)), and that they are more affected by the maturity rate spread
between short and long term treasuries than by the credit rate spread between commercial
bonds and treasuries (Swanson, Theis and Casey (2002)). Chui, Titman and Wei (2003)
propose that the 1990s marked an increase in the effect of market momentum on REITs
returns. REITs are also found to be sensitive to firm size and market to book ratio
(Sanders (1998) and Chen, Hsieh, Vines, and Chiou (1998)). Sun and Yung (2009) find
that idiosyncratic risk is positively related to EREITs returns.
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The other strand o f literature uses behavioral models to explain REITs returns.
Lin, Rahman, and Yung (2009) examine the effect of investor sentiment on REIT returns.
They find that when investors are optimistic (pessimistic), REIT returns get higher
(lower). Pyles (2009) document that Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD), commonly
known as “winter blues” has an effect on the returns of REITs. In the fall months when
the amount of daylight declines, SAD results in low returns as SAD inflicted investors
sell their risky holdings, which result in lower returns. Returns climb higher in winter
months as the amount of daylight increases. The results are driven by the smallest forty
percent o f REITs in the sample. Lin, Rahman, and Yung (2010) report that realized
returns lead trading volume, which suggests that investor overconfidence has an effect on
REITs returns.
Our paper is closely related to Sun, Yung, and Rahman (2010) who investigate
the effect of investor recognition on EREIT returns. Using Merton’s (1987) model of
investor recognition, they argue that EREITs returns are positively related to shadow
cost. Shadow cost refers to the additional returns required by investors to hold stocks for

which there is incomplete information. A zero cost trading strategy that longs high
shadow cost EREIT stocks and shorts low shadow cost EREIT stocks is associated with

significant positive returns. Our results reveal that investor attention, as measured by
SVI, has a significant positive effect on returns even after controlling for shadow cost.
This is especially true among stocks with no analyst coverage.

SAMPLE AND DATA
Our sample consists of EREIT firms listed in the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) between 2004 and 2012. The analysis starts in 2004 because it is the first
year for which SVI data is available. Our main explanatory variable, SVI, is obtained
through Google Trends at ('http://www.google.com/trends). SVI constitutes a term’s total
number of searches scaled by its time-series average and is produced weekly using
Google’s aggregate search frequency. It is considered an appropriate measure of investor
attention as search is a measure of attention and is representative of the entire population
due to the fact that Google is a commonly and frequently used search engine (Da et al
(2011)). SVI is obtained using each company’s ticker symbol (Da et al 2011). This
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allows accounting for search logs made for financial and investment purposes. In
addition, all SVI reports are obtained from the Finance Category in Google Trends to
reduce noise.
Return, market capitalization, and trading volume data are obtained from CRSP.
Accounting data is obtained from Compustat. Analyst coverage data is collected from the
I/B/E/S summary files and Institutional ownership is obtained from the 13f filings. The
final sample comprises 182 EREITs firms with complete data. Table I reports all
variables used in the study along with their definitions.

Table I
Variables Definition
Variable
SVI
Size
Book-to-Market
or Log(mtb)
Past Month
Return
Beta
Share Price or
Price
Illiquidity or

niqd
Dollar trading
volume
Daily absolute
stock return
Mkt-rf
SMB
HML
UMD
12 month
momentum
Instown

Definition
Monthly Google's search volume index
The natural logarithm of the previous calendar year’s average
market capitalization in thousands of dollars
The natural logarithm of the book value of equity divided by the
market value of equity, as of the previous year end
Previous month's stock return
A stock’s systematic risk
Previous month's stock price
Amihud illiquidity ratio and is daily absolute stock return to daily
dollar trading volume, scaled by 10-s
daily closing price times daily trading volume, averaged over days
in a year
absolute value of the stock's daily closing price
Monthly excess return on the market
Monthly performance of small stocks relative to big stocks
Monthly performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks
Monthly performance of high past 12 month return stocks relative
to low past 12 month return stocks
return on company’s stock over the past 12 months
monthly fraction of the number of shares owned by institutional
investors to the number of common shares outstanding
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idiosyncratic
volatility or
Idiovol
Log(size)
Analyst coverage
or ANUM
Fraction of
Individual
Ownership
Idiosyncratic
Volatility per
Investor
logmarketcap
logtumover
absabnretum
Monthly analyst
coverage
Advtosales
Shadow cost
Xt

M
logyTvol

monthly volatility of stock's return unexplained by fama french's
three factor model
Logarithm of total assets
logarithm of 1 plus the yearly number of analysts following a
stock
1- the monthly fraction of the number of shares owned by
institutional investors to the number of common shares
outstanding
the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to the number of shareholders

Logarithm of monthly market capitalization
Logarithm of monthly trading volume
Absolute value of monthly equally weighted excess return
logarithm of 1 plus the monthly number of analysts following a
stock
Ratio of advertising expense to sales in the previous fiscal year. If
missing on Compustat, advertising expense is set to 0
Shadow cost of incomplete information. It equals 2.5 * idiovol *
X t * ( 1-M)/M
the capitalization of the firm divided by total EREITS market cap
the ratio of the number of shareholders to the total number of
investors in the market
Logarithm of yearly trading volume

RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
Table II displays the mean, median, and standard deviation of the main variables
used in the study. SVI is the monthly Google's search volume index number. SVI’s mean
value among EREITs used in the sample is 40.70 with a standard deviation of 76.63.
Size is the natural logarithm of the previous calendar year’s average market capitalization
in thousands of dollars. The mean size of companies in the sample is 13.65 and the
standard deviation is 1.67. The book to market ratio is measured as the natural logarithm
o f the book value o f equity divided by the market value of equity, as of the previous year
end. The average value o f the book to market ratio is -0.59 with a standard deviation of
0.76. The mean past month return of EREIT firms in the sample is 0.8% and the standard

13

deviation is 11%. Share price depicts the previous month's stock price. The average
monthly share price for the EREITs in the sample is 29.21 with a median value of 20.26
and a standard deviation o f 36.46. Illiquidity is measured using the Amihud illiquidity
ratio, which is the daily absolute stock return to daily dollar trading volume, scaled
by 10-5 . The average value of the illiquidity measure is 11.32, a median of 0.02, and a
standard deviation of 359.75. Momentum is the return on company’s stock over the past
12 months. The mean value is 0.11 with a standard deviation of 0.37. The average
number of analysts following an EREIT is 1.67 with a standard deviation o f 0.59.
Institutional ownership is the fraction of the number of shares owned by institutional
investors to the number of common shares outstanding. The mean o f institutional
ownership is 74% with a standard deviation of 47%. Idiosyncratic volatility is the
monthly volatility of stock's return unexplained by Fama French's three factor model.
The mean idiosyncratic volatility is 2% with a standard deviation of 48%. Advtosales is
the ratio o f advertising expense to sales in the previous fiscal year. If missing on
Compustat, advertising expense is set to 0. The m ean value is 0.7% w ith a standard
deviation of 3%.
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Table II
Descriptive Statistics
This table displays the mean, median, and standard deviation o f the main variables used in the
study. The sample consists o f 182 firms EREIT firms from 2004 to 2012. SVI is the monthly
Google's search volume index number. Size is the natural logarithm o f the previous calendar
year’s average market capitalization in thousands o f dollars. BM is the book to market ratio is
measured as the natural logarithm o f the book value of equity divided by the market value of
equity, as o f the previous year end. The past month return is the previous month's stock return.
Share price is the previous month's stock price. ILLIQ*10-5 is measured using the Amihud
illiquidity ratio, which is the daily absolute stock return to daily dollar trading volume, scaled
bylO-5 . Momentum is the return on company’s stock over the past 12 months. ANUM is
logarithm o f 1 plus the yearly number o f analysts following a stock. Instown is the fraction o f the
number o f shares owned by institutional investors to the number o f common shares outstanding.
Idiovol is the monthly volatility of stock's return unexplained by fama french's three factor model.
Advtosales is the ratio o f advertising expense to sales in the previous fiscal year. If missing on
Compustat, advertising expense is set to 0.

Variable
SVI
size
BM
Past month return
Share price
ILLIQ*10~5
Momentum
ANUM
instown
idiovol
Advtosales

Mean
40.70
13.65
-0.59
0.008
29.21
11.32
0.11
1.67
0.74
0.02
0.007

Median
0
13.88
-0.55
0.01
20.26
0.02
0.13
1.79
0.79
0.01
0

Std Dev
76.63
1.67
0.76
0.11
36.46
359.75
0.37
0.59
0.47
0.48
0.03

Comparative Statistics
In Table III, we identify no SVI and high SVI stocks and compare their firm
characteristics. The mean (median) level of size for high SVI stocks is 13.78 (13.97)
compared to 13.36 (13.55) for no SVI stocks. High SVI stocks are significantly larger
than no SVI stocks. Using book to market ratio, we find that the mean (median) levels
are -0.49 (-0.53) for high SVI stocks compared to -0.55 (-0.52) for stocks with no SVI.
The mean difference shows that high SVI stocks have significantly higher of book to
market ratio. The median difference, however, shows that high SVI stocks have
significantly lower book to market than no SVI stocks. The mean (median) level of share
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price is 27.43 (20.02) for high SVI stocks compared to 31.75 (17.00) for no SVI stocks.
The mean difference o f share price is significantly lower for high SVI stocks relative to
no SVI stocks. The median difference of share price, however, is significantly higher for
high SVI stocks relative to no SVI stocks. As for illiquidity, the mean (median) of high
SVI stocks is 22.67 (0.019) relative to 6.18 (0.0038) for no SVI stocks. The mean
difference shows that high SVI stocks are highly and more significantly illiquid than no
SVI stocks. The median difference, however, shows that high SVI stocks are less illiquid.
The mean (median) of analyst coverage for high SVI stocks is 1.78 (1.79) compared to
1.53(1.60) for no SVI stocks. High SVI stocks have significantly more analyst coverage
than no SVI stocks. We can conclude that high SVI stocks tend to be larger and generate
more analysts following relative to no SVI stocks.

Table III
SVI and EREIT characteristics
Table III reports the mean and median o f different EREITs characteristics for no SVI and high
SVI stocks and the difference between them. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
No SVI

High SVI

Size

13.36(13.55)

13.78(13.97)

Book-market

-0.55 (-0.52)

-0.49 (-0.53)

Share price

31.75 (17.00)

27.43 (20.02)

Illiquidity*10-5

6.18(0.038)

22.67 (0.019)

Analyst coverage

1.53 (1.60)

1.78(1.79)

Difference in
mean (p-value)

0.41 ***(<-0001)
-0.06 ***
(<.0001)
4.31*** (<.0001)
-16.49***
(<.0001)
-0.24***
(<.0001)

Difference in
median (pvalue)
-0.42***
(<.0001)
0.01***
(<.0001)
-3.02***
(<.0001)
0.019***
(<.0001)
-0.19***
(<.0001)

SVI and other investor attention measures
In this section, we examine whether SVI is related to other investor attention
measures and whether it provides explanatory power to EREITs beyond that provided by
these alternative measures. Table IV-A displays the correlation between SVI and other
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investor attention measures. The table shows that, in general, log (SVI) has a relatively
low correlation with other investor measures. The correlation between log (SVI) and
logmarketcap, logtumover, absabnretum, analystcoverage, and advtosales are 4.856%,
14.708%, 2.352%, 11.094%, and -6.111% respectively. Although the correlations
between log (SVI) and logmarketcap, logtumover, analystcoverage, and advtosales are
significant, all correlations remain low.
In Table IV-B, we regress monthly log (SVI) on alternative monthly measures of
investor attention. Logmarketcap is negatively and significantly related to log(SVI) in
columns (1), (2), and (3). This suggests that stocks that generate high SVI tend to be
small stocks. Logtumover is positively and significantly related to log (SVI) in columns
(1), (2), and (3), which means that an increase in trading volume increases investor
attention. Absabnretum and Advtosavles are significantly negatively related to log (SVI)
in all columns while log (SVI) and analyst coverage is positively related.
The R2 for the regression reported in column (1) is 3.08% and 2.01% for columns (2) and
(3). The values of R2 in all regressions are very small, which means that alternative
measures of attention explain a small fraction of the variation in SVI. This is similar to
the findings of Da et al (2011). SVI, therefore, is a unique investor attention measure
among EREITs.

Table IV-A
Correlation between SVI and other investor attention measures

logSVI

logmarketcap

logSVI

logmarketcap

logtumover

absabnretum

analystcoverage

Advtosales

1

0.048569***

0.14708***

0.02352***

0.11094***

-0.06111***

<.0001

<.0001

0.0088

<.0001

<.0001

12406

12406

12405

12406

5776

10776

0.04856***

1

0.76130***

-0.20991***

0.26871***

0.08641***

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

logtumover

12406

13439

13435

13366

6039

10852

0.14708***

0.76130***

1

0.05292***

0.36141***

0.05621***

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

<.0001

12405

13435

13362

6046

10851

13501
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absabnretum

analystcoverage

Advtosales

0.02352***

-0.20991***

0.05292***

0.0088

<.0001

<.0001

12406

13366

13362

0.11094***

0.26871***

<.0001

1

0.01759

-0.03267***

0.1718

0.0007

13366

6038

10809

0.36141***

0.01759

1

-0.03768***

<.0001

<.0001

0.1718

5776

6039

6046

6038

6051

5266

-0.06111***

0.08641***

0.05621***

-0.03267***

-0.03768***

1

<.0001

<.0001

<0001

0.0007

0.0062

10776

10852

10851

10809

5266

0.0062

10906

Table IV-B
SVI and alternative measures of attention
The dependent variable is the monthly log(SVI). Independent variables are defined in Table I. Pvalues are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively. The sample period is from January 2004 to December 2012.

Intercept
logmarketcap
logtumover
absabnretum

(1)
1.07626***
(<.0001)
-0.20990***
(<.0001)
0.30252***
(<.0001)
-0.61900**
(0.0114)

(2)
0.91094**
(0.0127)
-0.14082***
(<.0001)
0.21402***
(<.0001)
-1.47058***
(0.0005)
0.40042***
(<.0001)

12405
0.0308

5776
0.0201

Monthly analystcoverage
Advtosales
Observations
R2

(3)
1.29983***
(0.0010)
-0.12578***
(0.0002)
0.17291***
(<.0001)
-1.25422***
(0.0073)
0.36778***
(<.0001)
-4.27303***
(<.0001)
5256
0.0201

SVI and the cross section of EREITs returns
We investigate the impact of SVI on the cross section o f EREITs returns. We
first conduct a univariate analysis examining average returns and then conduct a
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multivariate analysis by forming subsamples of firms sorted by firm characteristics,
illiquidity, and investor recognition and controlling for various risk factors.
Univariate Analysis
Table V reports the average monthly returns of stocks double sorted by SVI and
firm characteristics. Each month, stocks are sorted into terciles by size, BM, past month
return, price, and illiquidity. Terciles 1 and 3 refer to the lowest and highest value of
each characteristic, respectively. Stocks in each characteristic-based tercile are sorted
into three SVI portfolios: no SVI, low SVI, and high SVI. Stocks with no SVI are first
identified. The remaining stocks are divided into low and high SVI groups using the
median value of SVI. The table displays the equal-weighed return of each portfolio
during the following month.
Examining all stocks in the sample, the table shows that the average monthly
return for stocks with no, low, and high SVI are 0.81%, 0.86% and 1.08%, respectively.
The average return between no SVI and high SVI stocks is -0.26%, which is significant at
the 1% level. The results show that, overall, stocks that generate high SVI earn higher
returns.
Double sorting stocks by SVI and size in panel A, we find that small stocks that
generate high SVI earn significantly higher returns than small stocks that generate no
SVI. Panel B shows that high book to market stocks with high SVI earn significantly
higher returns than high book to marker stocks with no SVI. Low book to market stocks
with high SVI, however, earn significantly lower returns than low book to market stocks
with no SVI. Panel C displays stocks double sorted by past month return and SVI. The
panel shows that for stocks that earned low to medium past month returns, high SVI
results in higher average returns than similar stocks with no SVI. Double sorting by price
and SVI, panel D shows that low and medium priced stocks that generate high SVI earn
significantly higher returns than similar no SVI stocks. Panel D reports that highly
illiquid stocks with high SVI earn significantly higher returns than highly illiquid stocks
with no SVI.
The table shows that stocks that generate high SVI earn higher returns compared
to stocks with no SVI. Double sorting by SVI and firm characteristics, we find that the
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results are driven by stocks that are more mispriced. High SVI stocks that are small, with
high book to market ratio, low past month return, low price, and are highly illiquid earn
higher average returns than similar stocks with no SVI.
This provides support the Barber and Odean (2008) attention hypothesis. Retail
investors are net-buyers of “attention-grabbing” EREIT stocks. As attention increases,
buying increases. This results in higher price pressure and higher returns.
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Table V
Search Volume Index and EREITS Returns: Univariate Comparisons
This table presents average monthly returns for EREIT stocks with no, low, and high Google’s
Search Volume Index (SVI). Each month, we sort stocks into terciles by size, BM, past month
return, price, and illiquidity. Terciles 1 and 3 refer to the lowest and highest value of each
characteristic, respectively. We sort each characteristic-based tercile into three SVI portfolios: no
SVI, low SVI, and high SVI. Stocks with no SVI are first identified. The remaining stocks are
divided into low and high SVI groups using the median value of SVI. We then compute the
equal-weighed return of each portfolio during the following month. The results are reported and
p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
Average Monthly Return
SVI
Low

No
All Stocks

t- Statistics for

0.81797

for
No-High

High
0.86019
1.08466
Panel A: By Size

P-value

No-High

No-High

-0.267***

-3.85

(0.0001)

-7.02

(<.0001)

1

-0.0585417

0.2903

0.9702

-1.03***

2

0.97916

0.94523

0.88608

0.0931

0.88

(0.3782)

3

1.53916

0.147

1.44

(0.1508)

1

1.32433

1.05041

0.46279

0.862***

9.14

(<.0001)

2

0.57964

0.84489

0.54277

0.0369

0.36

(0.7188)

3

0.57406

-1.32***
0.61462
1.89715
Panel C: By Past Month Return

-8.91

(<.0001)

1

0.84345

1.19374

1.18825

-0.345**

-2.49

(0.0127)

2

0.8498

0.81601

1.32888

-0.479***

-4.51

(<.0001)

3

0.74739

0.58069
0.71166
Panel D: By Price

0.0357

0.31

(0.7563)

1

0.69432

0.77523

1.30787

-0.614**

-3.72

(0.0002)

2

0.75761

0.79793

1.00259

-0.245***

-2.58

(0.0098)

3

1.00009

1.00713
0.94387
Panel E: By Illiquidity

0.0562

0.68

(0.4991)

1

0.92479

0.8911

0.99242

-0.068

-0.68

(0.4960)

2

1.06935

0.85394

1.04899

0.0204

0.18

(0.8570)

3

0.50543

0.90733

1.21352

-0.708***

-4.91

(<.0001)

1.3922
1.33946
Panel B: By Book-to-Market
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Multivariate analysis
We next identify the subsamples where the SVI effect is strongest. Table VI, Part
A, examines the profitability of an SVI-based trading strategy in subsamples of firms
sorted by firm characteristics and controlling for risk factors. We use three different
factor models: the CAPM, the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, and the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model. Each month, we sort stocks into terciles by size, BM, price,
and momentum. Terciles 1 and 3 refer to the lowest and highest value of each
characteristic, respectively. Stocks are then sorted into three portfolios: no SVI, low SVI,
and high SVI. Stocks with no SVI are first identified, and then the remaining stocks are
divided into the low and high SVI groups using the median value of SVI. We create zerocost portfolios that long high SVI stocks and short no SVI stocks in the following month.
Portfolio weights are rebalanced monthly. Reported numbers are alphas from regressing
the resulting time series of zero-investment portfolio returns on the CAPM, FF-3 and FF4.
Table VI, Part A, shows that the SVI effect is strong among small stocks but has
no effect on large stocks. We find significantly positive alphas among small stocks,
stocks with high book to market ratio, and stocks with medium past momentum. These
are stocks that are typically characterized by poor information dissemination and are
highly mispriced. This begs the question as to whether the SVI effect results in higher
returns due to reduction in mispricing or whether it is spurious and simply persists due to
limits of arbitrage.
In Table VI, Part B and C, we seek to explain the SVI effect. We investigate the
role o f the “impediments-to-trade” hypothesis and the “investor recognition” hypothesis
in explaining the investor attention effect.
The “Impediments-to-trade” hypothesis postulates that severe market frictions
constitute “impediments-to-trade” that limit arbitrageurs’ involvement, which causes
mispricing to persist. We examine whether impediments to trade are behind the SVI
effect. If impediments to trade are behind the SVI effect, then abnormal returns should
be prevalent among highly illiquid stocks. To proxy for illiquidity, we use the Amihud’s
(2002) illiquidity ratio, dollar trading volume, and price. Table VI, Part B, reports the
alphas related to a trading strategy that longs high SVI stocks and shorts no SVI stocks
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for subgroups sorted based on these illiquidity proxies. We find positive but insignificant
alphas among highly illiquid stocks. This suggests that impediments to trade are not
behind the SVI effect.
The investor recognition hypothesis advanced by Merton (1987) suggests that in
markets with incomplete information, investors are not aware of all securities. As a result,
a stock that has low investor recognition needs to offer higher returns to compensate its
holders for the risk borne. Lehavy and Sloan (2008) find that increased investor
recognition results in higher contemporaneous returns, but decreases expected returns
over the long run. We conjecture that when investors pay attention to a stock, the level of
investor recognition related to the stock increases, which increases returns. If SVI results
in higher investor recognition, then the SVI effect should be stronger among stocks
characterized by low investor recognition and high information incompleteness.
Two measures are used to proxy for the degree of information incompleteness.
These are analyst coverage and the fraction of individual ownership. Stocks with poor
analyst coverage and high fraction of individual ownership are stocks characterized by
high information incompleteness and therefore have low investor recognition.
In Table VI, part C, Panels A and B, we report the alphas related to a trading
strategy that longs high SVI stocks and shorts no SVI stocks for subgroups sorted based
on investor recognition measures. We find that the SVI effect is particularly strong
among stocks with no analyst coverage. These are stocks characterized by poor
information dissemination. SVI, therefore, increases investor recognition among these
stocks. This means that SVI plays an important role in increasing investor recognition.
Two other measures are used to proxy for the cost o f poor investor recognition.
Idiosyncratic volatility measures the risk that shareholders bear as a result of imperfect
diversification. Institutional ownership is a proxy for short sale constraints (Chen, Hong,
and Stein (2002)). In Table VI, part C, Panels C and D, we report the alphas related to a
trading strategy that longs high SVI stocks and shorts no SVI stocks for subgroups sorted
based on idiosyncratic volatility and institutional ownership. We find that the SVI effect
has no significant effect on idiosyncratic volatility or short sale constraints.
Overall, table VI shows that the SVI effect is strong among stocks that are small
and with poor information dissemination. The high returns witnessed among these stocks
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as a result o f high SVI is due to improvement in investor recognition. As investor
attention, as measured by SVI, increases, investor recognition of the stock increases,
which results in higher returns.

Table VI
SVI-Related Trading Profits by Firm Characteristics, Illiquidity and Investor
Recognition measures
This table examines the profitability of an SVI-based trading strategy in subsamples of firms
sorted by firm characteristics (Part A), illiquidity (Part B), and investor recognition (Part C).
Each month, we sort stocks into terciles by size, BM, price, momentum, and different liquidity
and investor attention measures. Terciles 1 and 3 refer to the lowest and highest value of each
characteristic, respectively. Stocks are then sorted into three portfolios: no SVI, low SVI, and
high SVI. Stocks with no SVI are first identified, and then the remaining stocks are divided into
the low and high SVI groups using the median value of SVI. We create zero-cost portfolios that
long high SVI stocks and short no SVI stocks in the following month. Portfolio weights are
rebalanced monthly. Reported numbers are alphas from regressing the resulting time series of
zero-investment portfolio returns on the CAPM, FF-3 and FF-4. P-values are in parentheses. *,
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Part A: By Firm Characteristics
CAPM
Factor

FF Three-Factor

Carhart Four-

Panel A: By Firm Size

0.0120**
(0.0499)
-0.000609
( 0.1440)
-0.000567
( 0.8709)

-0.003870
(0.2016)

Small
0.0122**
0.0126**
(0.0409)
(0.0365)
Medium
-0.000983
-0.001036
(0.7772)
(0.7873)
Large
-0.000314
-0.000383
(0.9128)
(0.9281)
Panel B: By Book-to-V arket
Low
-0.003632
(0.2284)
Medium

-0.003833
(0.1995)
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0.002882
(0.5079)
High
0.0109*
(0.0599)
Panel C: By Price

0.002955
(0.4943)
0.0104*
(0.0764 )

0.005444
(0.3556)
0.004796
(0.2098)
0.000921
(0.7260)

0.000263
(0.9523)
0.006357*
(0.0570)
0.003541
(0.4805)

0.002691
(0.5360)
0.0107*
( 0.0656)

Low
0.005807
0.005420
(0.3444)
(0.3158)
Medium
0.004878
0.004598
(0.1988)
(0.2197)
High
0.000943
0.000998
(0.7222)
(0.7079)
Pane D: By 12-month Momentum
Low
0.000279
(0.9493)
Medium
0.006312*
(0.0613)
High
0.004054
(0.4123)

0.000118
(0.9786)
0.006327*
(0.0622)
0.003637
(0.4535)

Part B: By Illiquidity measures
FF Three-Factor

CAPM
Factor

Carhart Four-

Panel A: By Amihud’s (2002) Illiquidity Ratio

0.000970
( 0.7011)
0.002060
(0.4617)
0.004757
(0.3046)

Low
0.001195
(0.6185)
Medium
0.002064
(0.4538)
High
0.005259
(0.2515)

0.001151
(0.6329)
0.002049
(0.4596)
0.005095
(0.2668)
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Panel B: By Dollar Trading Volume

0.003608
(0.4619)
0.003590
(0.3500)
0.000811
(0.7891 )

0.005771
(0.2812)
0.000674
( 0.8577)
-0.000173
( 0.9405)

Low
0.004128
(0.3953)
Medium
0.003606
(0.3444)
High
0.000973
(0.7444)
Panel C: By Price
Low
0.006218
(0.2459)
Medium
0.000829
(0.8253)
High
-0.000106
(0.9617)

0.003940
(0.4171)
0.003520
(0.3576)
0.001025
(0.7323)

0.005951
(0.2647)
0.000900
(0.8114)
-0.000157
(0.9435)

Part C: By Investor Recognition Measures

CAPM
Factor

FF Three-Factor

Carhart Four-

Panel A: By Analyst Coverage
No
0.008604*
0.008819*
(0.0848)
(0.0930)
Low
-0.004381
-0.004080
-0.003879
(0.3129)
(0.3531)
(0.3769)
High
0.001896
0.002019
0.001622
(0.6518)
(0.6710)
(0.7197)
Panel B: By the Fraction of Individual Ownership
0.008222
(0.1076)

0.004133

Low
0.004372

0.004236
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(0.2163)
-0.000127
( 0.9802)
0.001997
(0.6581)

0.000488
( 0.9026)
0.003525
(0.2828)
0.002188
(0.7270)

0.001519
(0.7390)
-0.000060
(0.9907)
0.004133
(0.2467)

(0.2163)
(0.2308)
Medium
-0.000127
-0.000446
(0.9802)
( 0.9296)
High
0.001997
0.002245
(0.6581)
(0.6168)
Panel C: By Idiosyncratic Volatility
Low
0.000139
-0.000320
( 0.9708)
(0.9290)
Medium
0.004090
0.004347
(0.1916)
(0.1567)
High
0.002530
0.002499
(0.6867)
(0.6920)
Panel D: By Institutional Ownership
Low
0.001997
0.002245
(0.6168)
(0.6581)
Medium
-0.000127
-0.000446
(0.9802)
(0.9296)
High
0.004372
0.004236
(0.2163)
(0.2308)

SVI and returns in different time horizons
We examine returns associated with SVI over time. We sort stocks into deciles
based on SVI to identify high SVI and no SVI stocks during the 1 month formation
period. High SVI stocks are stocks in the winner decile while no SVI stocks are stocks in
the loser decile. We hold winner and loser stocks for K months [t+1, t+k]. We skip a
month between the formation period and the holding period to avoid serial correlation. In
any month, we identify winner (High SVI) and loser (No SVI) stocks and calculate the
equally weighted raw return of stocks held for K months.
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Table VII shows the results with the winner and loser stocks as well as the
difference between the winner and loser stocks over the K months holding period. This
corresponds to a zero cost trading strategy that longs High SVI stocks and shorts no SVI
stocks. The table reports average raw returns, the CAPM alpha, and the Fama French
three factor model alpha. Panel A shows the results corresponding to the 1-month
formation period for the whole sample. Panels B, C, and D report the results
corresponding to the 1-month formation period for stocks with high book to market ratio,
small size, and low price, respectively.
Table VII shows the performance of portfolios with [t+1, t+3], [t+1, t+6], [t+7,
t+12], and [t+13, t+24] holding periods. Panel A indicates that a zero cost strategy that
longs high SVI stocks and shorts no SVI stocks results in negative returns, though not
significant. Controlling for the CAPM and the Fama French three factor model, we find
that the zero cost strategy results in a reversal within three months.
Prior results show that the zero cost trading strategy that longs high SVI stocks
and shorts no SVI stocks results in significant profits among high book to market and
small stocks. We explore the performance of the zero cost trading strategy over time
among high book to market stocks, small size and low priced stocks. Panel B reports the
results of a zero cost trading strategy that longs high SVI and shorts no SVI stocks over
time among high book to market stocks. We find that the strategy results in reversal in
the 3, 6, 7 to 12, and 13 to 24 months holding periods. The CAPM and the Fama French
three factor alphas show that we have a reversal in the 3 month and 6 month holding
periods. Panel C shows that the zero cost trading strategy results in negative average raw
returns during the 3,6, and 13 to 24 months holding periods. The CAPM and the Fama
French three factor model alphas show reversal during the 3 month holding period. Panel
D shows that the zero cost trading strategy among low priced stocks results in negative
average returns in the 3 month and 6 month holding periods. The CAPM and the Fama
French three factor model alphas show reversal in the 3 month holding period.
We find evidence o f negative returns if we long high SVI stocks and short no SVI
stocks over time. Although our results are not significant, they are in line with the
predictions of the attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008). Attention results in
increased buying, which temporarily pushes prices and returns higher. Over time, the
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price pressure is reversed. Da et al (2011) report similar findings. They find that in the
case o f IPOs, increased attention results in high abnormal returns in the first two weeks
and the effect is reversed in one year.

This table reports momentum

returns. We require at least 24 monthly observations. Winner (loser) portfolios represent the ten percent of stocks
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0.04***
(0.005)

(9000)
0

Losers
0.04***

0.008
(0.29)

0.006
(0.33)
0.02
(0.10)

0.003
(0.56)

0.02
(0.11)

Winners

Losers

(960)
0.008
(0.36)
0.02*
(0.06)

-0.002
(0.69)

0.008
(0.38)

0.022*
(0.07)

Winners-Losers

Winners

Losers

eoooo-

0.04***
(0.005)

0.007
(0.21)
0.02*
(0.09)

0.007
(0.21)
0.026*
(0.09)

-0.002
(0.84)

0.02*
(0.08)

0.01
(0.22)

0.008
(0.35)

0.02*
(0.08)

0.01
(0.16)

0.002
(0.71)

Panel D: Low price Sample - Formation period (-1,-1)

-0.002
(0.78)

-0.009
(0.37)

Winners-Losers

(160)
1000

(0.005)
Panel C: Small size Sample - Formation period (-1,-1)
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(0.33)

0.007
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0.0006
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-0.002
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0.003
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-0.001
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SVI and excess returns
In this section, we investigate the effect of investor attention on EREITs excess
returns. We control for variables that the literature reported as having an effect on
EREITs returns as well as alternative measures of investor attention.
To show that SVI provides additional explanatory power, it is important to control
for short sale constraints. To do so, we use institutional ownership, which is a proxy for
short-sale constraints (Chen et al (2002)). Merton (1997) finds that idiosyncratic
volatility has an effect on returns. While Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) find a
negative relationship, Boehme, Danielsen, Kumar, and Sorescu (2009) report a positive
relationship. Illiquidity, logTA, and logMB, and systematic risk (beta) are also important
controls (Sun et al (2010)).
Momentum is another variable that proved to have a significant effect on REIT
returns (Hung and Glascock (2008) and Ooi, Wang and Webb (2009)). Sun et al (2010)
report that it is important to consider shadow cost as it has a significant effect on REITs
returns. Analyst coverage is also another important variable. Khoo, Hartzeil, and Hoesli
(1993) find that analyst coverage is related to lower REIT returns due to the lower risk
associated with increased information dissemination. Chemmanur and Yan (2009) use
advertising expenditures as a proxy for investor attention and find that it has effect on
short-run and long-run stock returns. Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) use trading
volume as proxy for stock’s visibility and study its impact on returns.
Table VIII presents the cross sectional time series regressions used. Column (1)
shows that SVI has a significant positive effect on EREITs excess returns at the 1% level.
Other controls that have significant effect on EREITs returns are beta, logMB, illiquidity,
and momentum at the 1% level.
Controlling for shadow cost, which is a measure of investor recognition, SVI
continues to have a significant positive effect on excess returns at the 10% level. Shadow
cost along with beta, logMB, illiquidity, and momentum are all controls that have a
significant effect on EREITs returns at the 1% level. LogTA has a significant effect on
returns at the 10% level. We conclude that SVI provides explanatory power to EREITs
beyond the effect of investor recognition.
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Columns (3), (4), and (5) show a positive, though insignificant, impact of SVI on
EREITs excess returns controlling for analyst coverage, advertising expenditures, and
trading volume; respectively. In column (3), institutional ownership, beta, illiquidity, and
momentum are all controls that have a significant impact on excess returns at the 1%
level. Idiosyncratic volatility and logMB have a significant impact at the 5% level. In
column (4), institutional ownership, beta, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, and
momentum all are controls that have a significant impact on excess returns at the 1%
level. In column (5), beta, logMB, illiquidity, momentum, and trading volume
(logyTvol) have a significant impact on returns at the 1% level. LogTA has a significant
impact on excess returns at the 5% level.
As previously suggested, Khoo et al (1993) find that analyst coverage is related to
lower REIT returns due to the lower risk associated with increased information
dissemination. Merton (1987) also suggests that analyst coverage reduces information
incompleteness and increases investor recognition. This implies that stocks followed by
analysts and that have high investor attention are likely to generate lower returns than
stocks with no analyst coverage and high investor attention.
Table IX-A shows the effect of investor attention on excess returns by splitting
the sample between stocks with no analyst following and stocks with analyst following.
The table shows that, for the full sample, SVI results in significantly positive excess
returns at the 1% level. It also shows that stocks with no analyst following generate
significantly positive excess return at the 1% level. Stocks with analyst following have a
positive effect on excess returns, though not significant. The results show that the
positive effect o f investor attention on excess returns in the full sample is driven by
stocks with no analyst coverage.
Table IX-B presents the effect of investor attention on excess returns by
controlling for investor recognition. The table shows the results for the whole sample as
well as by subsamples of no analyst coverage and with analyst coverage. The table
shows that, for the whole sample, SVI results in positive and significant excess returns.
For stocks with no analyst coverage, SVI results in positive and significant EREITs
excess returns. For the subsample of stocks with analyst following, SVI results in
negative but insignificant excess returns. Therefore, controlling for investor recognition,
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increased SVI results in positive and significant excess returns and the results are driven
by stocks with no analyst coverage.
In summary, we find that increased investor attention, measured by SVI, results in
positive price pressure and higher excess returns, even after controlling for investor
recognition among EREITs. The effect is driven by stocks that are characterized by
information incompleteness and opacity, such as stocks with no analyst coverage. We
conclude that our results provide further support to the attention hypothesis of Barber and
Odean (2008) and Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis.
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Table VIII
The effect of SVI and other investor attention measures on returns
In this table, we perform monthly regressions examining the effect of SVI on return along with
alternative measures of attention. The dependent variable is monthly excess returns on the
company stock. Independent variables are SVI, institutional ownership, idiosyncratic risk, size,
MB, illiquidity, and momentum. Regression (1) examines the effect of SVI on returns.
Regression (2), (3), (4), and (5) control for shadow cost, analyst coverage, advertising
expenditures to sales, and annual turnover. Definitions are available in Table I. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Intercept
SVI
instown
beta
idiovol
logTA
logMB
ILLIO*10"5
Momentum

(1)
-0.00220*
(0.0766)
0.00000782***
(0.0025)
-0.00059772
(0.1759)
0.00049137***
(<.0001)
0.00041174
(0.5315)
-0.00002806
(0.8653)
0.00116***
(<.0001)
0.00000308***
(<.0001)
0.04182***
(<.0001)

Shadow cost

(2)
-0.00382***
(0.0021)
0.00000419*
(0.0977)
-0.00058815
(0.1761)
0.00051572***
(<.0001)
0.00045579
(0.4759)
0.00029605*
(0.0728)
0.00075462***
(0.0066)
0.00000426***
(<.0001)
0.04063***
(<.0001)
0.00090850***
(<.00011

(3)
-0.00138
(0.4082)
0.00000360
(0.1763)
0.00300***
(0.0010)
0.00102***
(<.0001)
-0.04143**
(0.0130)
-0.00029395
(0.2665)
0.00072020**
(0.0269)
-0.00048306***
(<.0001)
0.04090***
(<.0001)

(4)
-0.09045
(0.4474)
0.00030235
(0.1850)
0.22399***
(<.0001)
0.00627***
(<.0001)
2.87212***
(<.0001)
-0.01915
(0.1923)
-0.00014470
(0.9966)
-0.07230***
(<.0001)
0.08538***
(0.0016)

-0.00034059
(0.4843)

ANUM

-0.01267
(0.5343)

Advtosales
logyTvol
Observations
R2

(5)
-0.00615***
(0.0005)
0.00000307
(0.2387)
-0.00052411
(0.2429)
0.00049418***
(<.0001)
0.00060470
(0.3548)
-0.00073560**
(0.0104)
0.00100***
(0.0005)
0.00000421***
(<.0001)
0.04183***
(<.0001)

234319
0.0237

224465
0.0244

208345
0.0265

2276
0.1089

0.00074508***
(0.0010)
229412
0.0240
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Table IX-A
The effect of SVI by analyst coverage
In this table, we perform monthly regressions examining the effect of SVI on returns controlling
for alternative measures of attention. The dependent variable is monthly excess returns on the
company stock. Independent variables are SVI, institutional ownership, idiosyncratic risk, size,
MB, illiquidity, and momentum. The results for the full sample are reported. Results for
subsamples with no analyst coverage and with analyst coverage are also reported. Definitions are
available in Table I. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.

Intercept
SVI
instown
beta
idiovol
logTA
logMB
ILLIQ*10"5
Momentum
Observations
R2

Full sample
-0.00220
(0.0766)*
0.00000782***
(0.0025)
-0.00059772
(0.1759)
0.00049137***
(<.0001)
0.00041174
(0.5315)
-0.00002806
(0.8653)
0.00116***
(<.0001)
0.00000308***
(<.0001)
0.04182***
(<.0001)
234319
0.0237

NoANUM
-0.01384***
(0.0001)
0.00013789***
(<.0001)
-0.00147***
(0.0099)
-0.00446***
(<.0001)
0.00060718
(0.4019)
0.00171***
(0.0068)
0.00142*
(0.0733)
0.00000237***
(0.0007)
0.05068***
(<.0001)
25974
0.0466

With ANUM
-0.00101
(0.5237)
0.00000326
(0.2131)
0.00298***
(0.0011)
0.00102***
(<.0001)
-0.04001**
(0.0157)
-0.00041333**
(0.0408)
0.00072938**
(0.0249)
-0.00048237***
(<.0001)
0.04091***
(<.0001)
208345
0.0265
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Table IX-B
The effect of SVI by analyst coverage, controlling for investor recognition
In this table, we perform monthly regressions examining the effect of SVI on returns controlling
for alternative measures of attention. The dependent variable is monthly excess returns on the
company stock. Independent variables are SVI, institutional ownership, idiosyncratic risk, size,
MB, illiquidity, momentum, and shadow cost. The results for the full sample are reported.
Results for subsamples with no analyst coverage and with analyst coverage are also reported.
Definitions are available in Table I. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.

Intercept
SVI
instown
beta
idiovol
logTA
logMB
ILLIO*10“5
Momentum
Shadow cost
Observations
R2

Full Sample
-0.00382***
(0.0021)
0.00000419*
(0.0977)
-0.00058815
(0.1761)
0.00051572***
(<.0001)
0.00045579
(0.4759)
0.00029605*
(0.0728)
0.00075462***
(0.0066)
0.00000426***
(<.0001)
0.04063***
(<.0001)
0.00090850***
(<.0001)
224465
0.0244

NoANUM
-0.00305
(0.4580)
0.00017264***
(<.0001)
-0.00119**
(0.0471)
-0.00438***
(<.0001)
0.00107
(0.2160)
-0.00031893
(0.6601)
0.00317***
(0.0002)
0.00000270***
(0.0004)
0.05867***
(<.0001)
-0.00113
(0.2578)
22335
0.0504

With ANUM
-0.01365***
(<.0001)
-0.00000159
(0.5298)
0.00381***
(<.0001)
0.00113***
(<.0001)
0.33733***
(<.0001)
0.00037988*
(0.0553)
0.00194***
(<.0001)
-0.00007202
(0.5499)
0.03936***
(<.0001)
0.00097512***
(<.0001)
202130
0.0280
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SUMMARY
Traditional asset pricing models assume that prices immediately adjust to reflect
all available information. However, Kahneman (1973) reports that attention is a scarce
cognitive resource. This means that investors are limited in terms of the amount of
information they can process, which suggests that prices may not immediately adjust to
reflect all available information.
In this study, we investigate the effect of investor attention on EREITs returns.
We find that an increase in SVI, a direct investor attention proxy, results in significant
positive returns. The univariate analysis shows that this is especially true for EREITs
that are small, with high book to market ratio, low past month return, low price, and are
highly illiquid. The multivariate analysis using the CAPM, the Fama-French (1993)
three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model shows that increased
investor attention results in higher returns for stocks that are small and with high book to
market ratio. We show that the SVI effect does not persist due to impediments to trade.
Rather, SVI improves investor recognition, which results in high average returns.
Investigating the effect of SVI on returns over time, we find evidence of return reversal,
which is in line with the expectations of the attention hypothesis.
We also investigate the impact of SVI on excess returns controlling for alternative
investor attention measures and other EREITs returns determinants. We find that
increases in SVI results in high excess returns. Splitting the sample between EREITs
with no analyst coverage and those with analyst coverage, we find that the effect is driven
by stocks with no analyst coverage.
We conclude that SVI improves investor recognition and results in significant
excess returns among EREITs that suffer from poor information dissemination and high
information incompleteness. These findings are in line with the expectations of the
attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) and Merton’s (1987) investor
recognition hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 2
INVESTOR ATTENTION AND THE OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES POST
ANNOUNCEMENT RETURNS

ABSTRACT
Investors are limited in terms of the information they can process. According to
the attention hypothesis, under-reaction in asset pricing is a result o f the brain’s
limitations in processing large amounts of information. The attention hypothesis is used
to generate insights into stock repurchases price drift. Using a sample of 318 firms that
made repurchase announcements between 2004 and 2008 and which have weekly search
volume data in Google Trends, we find that investor attention has an effect on the
repurchase drift for stocks during the first year following the announcement. More
specifically, we find that high abnormal search volume leads to a positive effect on
cumulative returns during the first year following the announcement for small stocks,
stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, low market to book ratio, and low past return. Low
abnormal search volume signals a decrease in investor attention and results in negative
returns among all stocks. The results provide further support to the attention hypothesis.

INTRODUCTION
The efficient market hypothesis suggests that stock prices reflect all available
information (Fama 1970). However, empirical evidence has shown several instances
where the market efficiency hypothesis was violated. For example, Ikenberry,
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) document stock price under-reaction following open
market repurchase announcements. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) find evidence
o f under-reaction to earnings announcements as well as momentum effects. Michaely,
Thaler and Womack (1995) document evidence of drift following dividend initiations and
omissions. Similarly, Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) find evidence of drift
following stock splits.
Prior research has shown that the existence of pricing anomalies is due to limits to
arbitrage (Pontiff (2006), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Chen,
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Hong, and Stein (2002), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), and Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis
(2010)). The arbitrage risk hypothesis suggests that asset mispricing is due to the
presence o f idiosyncratic risk, which acts as a deterrent to arbitrage activity. Thus, the
higher a firm’s idiosyncratic risk, the more likely it is to be mispriced. By the same
token, the lower a firm’s idiosyncratic risk, the more likely it is to trade close to
fundamental value due to arbitrage activity and involvement of professional traders.
Another strand of literature attributes mispricing to investor psychological biases. Hong,
Harrison and Stein 1999). Barberis et al (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (1998)) attribute mispricing to cognitive biases, such as sentiment,
conservatism, or over-confidence.
This paper focuses of the anomaly of stock price under-reaction following
repurchase announcements. Open market share repurchases offer a situation where the
efficient market hypothesis is violated. In a now classical paper, Ikenberry et al (1995)
examine the long-run stock price performance of firms that announced open market
repurchase programs between 1980 and 1990. They show that the average abnormal four
year returns following the repurchase announcement is 12.1%. The average abnormal
return is even higher for value stocks, amounting to 45.3%. Later papers have supported
these findings and found that open market share repurchases are associated with positive
abnormal returns up to three years following the announcement (Stephens and Weisbach
(1998), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000), Jagannathan, Murali, and
Stephens (2003), Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004), Chan, Ikenberry, Lee and Wang
(2010)). Ikenberry et al (1995) suggest that the reason for such drift is that the market
fails to immediately incorporate information following a repurchase announcement. In
other words, the delayed response shows evidence of under-reaction.
To explain the stock price post repurchase drift anomaly, we use a model that
accounts for limits to arbitrage as well as uses a finance behavioral concept, which is
investor attention. It is important to consider this question for several reasons. First, post
repurchase price drift has not been studied from the perspective of investor attention.
Most studies examine the link between under-reaction and the attention hypothesis in the
context of earnings (Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Hirshleifer et al 2004, Hou and
Moskowitz (2005), Cohen and Frazzini (2008), Hou et al 2008, Hirshleifer et al 2009,
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and DellaVigna and Pollet (2009). The impact of attention on returns following stock
buybacks is lacking. Second, under-reaction is stronger among firms characterized by
high idiosyncratic risk (Ikenberry et al (1995)). Such mispricing persists due to limits to
arbitrage that result from high idiosyncratic risk (Pontiff (2006), Shleifer and Vishny
1997, Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Chen et al (2002), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), and
Doukas et al (2010)). This paper seeks to identify the impact that investor attention has
on the post repurchase price drift given different levels of limits to arbitrage and
idiosyncratic risk. Finally, this paper adds to the existing literature by using a novel and
direct proxy of individual investor attention; Google’s Search Volume Index (SVI) (Da et
al 2011). SVI represents a term’s total number of searches scaled by its time-series
average and is produced weekly using Google’s aggregate search frequency. Given that
search is a measure of attention and that Google is a commonly used search engine, its
reported search logs are likely to be representative of that of the entire population and, as
a result, appropriate in measuring investor attention (Da et al 2011).
The univariate analysis shows that an increase in Google’s search volume, as
measured by Abnormal Search Volume Index (ASVI), results in positive and significant
cumulative returns for all stocks. The univariate analysis also shows that ASVI has the
largest and most significant impact on stocks that are small, with low market to book
ratio, are low priced, are more illiquid and are with low analyst coverage. The
multivariate analysis reports that ASVI results in higher cumulative returns during the
first year following the repurchase announcement. The results are driven by small stocks.
Further analysis shows that high ASVI results in positive and significant effect on
cumulative returns among stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, low market to book ratio,
and low past return. We conclude that retail investor attention, as measured by Google’s
ASVI, increases buying among stocks that suffer from limits to arbitrage. This reduces
mispricing and results in the impounding of the repurchase announcement information
into stock prices. This is in line with the predictions of investor attention hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first section presents the
theoretical development. Methodology and sample description are provided in the
second section. The third section summarizes the findings. The final section concludes
the paper.
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THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Ikenberry et al (1995) suggest that the reason for the stock price post repurchase
drift is that the market fails to immediately incorporate information following a
repurchase announcement. The delayed response shows evidence of under-reaction.
Under-reaction refers to the slow incorporation of information in the stock price of a firm
following good news shock (Ikenberry et al 1995). It causes the stock price to trade
below fundamental value and to exhibit short term trends in returns (Barberis et al
(1998)).
In the behavioral finance literature, under-reaction is attributed to two reasons;
conservatism (Barberis et al 1998) and investors’ limited attention/ recognition (Merton
(1987), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), Peng (2005),
DellaVigna and Pollet (2007), Peng and Xiong (2006), Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2008), and
Hirshleifer, Seongyeon and Teoh (2009)).
Conservatism suggests that “individuals are slow to change their beliefs in the
face o f new evidence” Barberis et al (1998, p. 315). Under conservatism, investors are
aware of the newly available information, but they react to it partially. According to
Griffin and Tversky (1992), under-reaction is a result of the weight and strength given to
a news item. Strength refers to the importance given to the new evidence. Weight refers
to the credence and plausibility that is given to that news item. Under-reaction results
when a piece o f news that is credible is given less importance. This means that under
reaction happens when a news item that has high weight is given less strength.
According to the attention hypothesis, under-reaction is not so much a result of
conservatism, but is a result of investor inattention. Under-reaction, thus, is a result of
the brain’s limitations in processing large amounts of information.
Attention is a scarce cognitive resource that helps an individual deploy more
mental faculty to one object or thought relative to others (Kahneman (1973)). Due to the
large amount of information that investors receive and given that attention is a scarce
cognitive resource, investors are limited in terms of the information they can process
(Cohen and Frazzini 2008). As a result, they select the type of information to which they
can devote attention. Attention helps investors incorporate available information into
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their wealth (Karlsson et al 2005). Inattention results in the slow incorporation of
information in asset pricing, which results in under-reaction.
The Attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) suggests that individual
investors are net-buyers of “attention-grabbing” stocks. Prior to buying, investors
consider a set o f stocks they research and to which they pay attention. When buying, they
choose from this set o f stocks. The attention hypothesis advances that increased attention
leads to increased buying, which temporarily pushes prices higher and results in higher
returns.
The attention hypothesis is closely related to the investor recognition hypothesis
advanced by Merton (1987). The hypothesis suggests that in markets with incomplete
information, investors do not know about all securities. Consequently, the lower the
number o f investors that know about a security, the lower is its investor recognition and
vice versa. Merton posits that stocks with low investor recognition require high returns
to compensate their holders for the risk they bear. Before investors recognize a stock,
they must first pay attention to it. Attention is, therefore, a pre-requisite to investor
recognition (Ding and Hou 2011).
Several models have examined asset pricing using the attention hypothesis.
Huberman and Regev (2001) document the case of a firm’s stock whose price soared
dramatically following the publication of a related news item in the New York Times.
The news was stale, though, because it was published in other media outlets months
earlier but received no attention. Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) show that
investors pay more attention to accounting profitability compared to cash profitability,
which leads to the former predicting long-run returns. Hou and Moskowitz (2005) find
that stock price delay is related to proxies of investor recognition. Cohen and Frazzini
(2008) provide evidence that investor inattention exists, which explains the return
predictability for firms that are economically linked. Barber and Odean (2008) show that
investors’ buying and selling is driven by highly publicized news and events, which
suggests that investor attention is instrumental in asset pricing. Hou, Peng, and Xiong
(2008) find that over-reaction in stock prices is associated with increased investor
attention; whereas under-reaction is caused by investor inattention. Hirshleifer, Lim and
Teoh (2009) suggest that the immediate price response to earnings surprises is weaker
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and the post-earnings announcement drift is stronger when a firm’s earnings are
announced in a day that is crowded by other earnings announcements. This suggests that
investor attention and distraction play a role in asset pricing. DellaVigna and Pollet
(2009) find that earnings announcements made on Fridays have a 15% lower immediate
response and a 70% higher delayed response. The authors attribute these results to high
investor inattention on Fridays. Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2012) provide
further evidence that supports the effect of investor attention on asset pricing. Their
research documents the positive relationship between total viewership, especially among
wealthy viewers, and the overnight returns associated with stocks mentioned by Jim
Cramer in his popular CNBC show Mad Money.
All in all, these studies have found that limited investor attention is responsible
for under-reaction. The more attention a firm receives, the more quickly new information
is incorporated into its stock price. When a firm receives less attention, new information
is not immediately incorporated into its stock price, which results in price under-reaction.
Prior studies have used different m easures to capture investor attention. Gervais,

Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) used trading volume as an indicator of stock’s visibility
and investigated its impact on future abnormal returns. Hou et al (2008) used it to assess
price and momentum strategies. Chemmanur and Yan (2009), Grullon, Kanatas, and
Weston (2004), and Lou (2014) used advertising expenditures as a proxy for investor
attention to study its effect on short-run and long-run stock returns, the presence of
individual and institutional investors and stock liquidity, and short-term stock excess
returns and manager timing; respectively. Barber and Odean (2008) used prior excess
returns to measure investor attention and found that it predicts future abnormal returns.
They also used a stock’s appearance in the media as a proxy of investor attention and
found that it results in excess returns. Similarly, Yuan (2008) investigated news
headlines’ influence on investor trading behavior. Seasholes and Wu (2007) used price
limits as a proxy for investor attention and found that Shanghai stocks that reach price
limits enjoy higher returns, higher turnover, and higher media attention.
Da et al (2011) argue that proxies such as trading volume, advertising, excess
returns, news and media reports, and price limits do not truly reflect investor attention.
They suggest that a stock’s excess returns or abnormal trading volume may not only be
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due to abnormal investor attention, but to other factors. In addition, appearance in the
news may result in increased investor attention, but not always (Huberman and Regev
(2001)). In fact, often times, investors are overwhelmed by the amount of financial news
and information reported in the media (Cohen and Frazzini 2008). Therefore, a more
direct proxy, such as SVI, is needed to measure investor attention.
SVI is considered a proxy that is specific to individual investors because these
latter use the internet to obtain financial information (Da et al 2011). More sophisticated
institutional investors use information services such as Reuters and Bloomberg terminals.
SVI, thus, enables the examination of the direct impact of retail investors’ attention on
the stocks of firms that announced stock buybacks.
Individual investors are considered for the purpose of this study because they are
more likely to buy “attention grabbing” stocks (Barber and Odean 2008). Attention is not
as limited for institutional investors as it is for individual investors. Institutional
investors allocate a significant amount of time to stock research as well as use advanced
technology to aid in their search. Thus, to study the effect o f attention on the returns

following stock buybacks, a measure of individual investor attention, such as the SVI, is
appropriate.
More specifically, we look at Abnormal SVI (ASVI), which is defined as “the (log)
SVI during the current week minus the (log) median SVI during the previous eight
weeks” Da et al (2011. p 1463). ASVI depicts abnormal attention or attention shock. We
measure the ASVI for each week following the repurchase announcement and study its
impact on prices and returns.
An increase in ASVI is expected to result in positive abnormal returns following
the repurchase announcement. The attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008)
predicts that attention results in increased buying, which pushes returns higher. This
implies that as investors’ attention increases, the repurchase announcement news gets
incorporated in the stock price. We hypothesize that:

H I : A n i n c r e a s e in A S V I r e s u l t s in p o s i t i v e a b n o r m a l r e t u r n s f o l l o w i n g t h e r e p u r c h a s e
announcem ent

49

In the finance literature, mispricing anomalies, such as under-reaction, are due to
the presence of idiosyncratic risk and limits to arbitrage (Doukas et al 2010). The
arbitrage risk hypothesis suggests that mispricing is higher among high idiosyncratic risk
stocks compared to low idiosycraytic risk stocks (Pontiff (1996), Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), Gromb andVayanos (2002), Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), and Hirshleifer and
Teoh (2003), and Doukas et al (2010). To hedge against fundamental risk, arbitrageurs
have to take an opposite position in a stock that is a close substitute to the mispriced
stock. Given that arbitrageurs are risk averse (Pontiff 2006) and that high idiosyncratic
risk stocks have fewer close substitutes, such stocks continue to be mispriced due to lack
o f professional investors’ involvement.
Idiosyncratic risk is a risk that is specific to the firm and that is independent of the
market risk (Fu 2009). The Fama French model is used to estimate it. Each week, excess
returns are regressed on the excess returns on the market portfolio, the difference in
returns between small and large stocks, and the difference in returns between high market
to book stocks and low market to book stocks.

Ri(t) - Rf(t) = a + p 1(Rm(t) - Rf(t)) + p2SMB(t) + p3HML(t) + e,(t)

(1)

Idiosyncratic risk is measured as the standard error of the model’s residuals.
Weekly stock returns obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
and weekly factor data are obtained from the Kenneth R. French’s website.2 Market to
book ratio and past week return are two other measures used to proxy for limits to
arbitrage.
Stocks that are characterized by high idiosyncratic risk, low market to book ratio
and low past week return are stocks that suffer from limits to arbitrage. Such stocks tend
to be mispriced. Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2009) also report that these stocks
tend to be dominated by retail investors. An increase in ASVI results from an increase in
retail investor attention. This latter in turn results in increased buying, which pushes
prices and returns higher (Barber and Odean (2008)).

2 http://m ba.tuck.dartm outh.edu/paees/facultv/ken.french/data librarv.html
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We expect that following a repurchase announcement, an increase in ASVI among
firms with high idiosyncratic risk, low market to book ratio, and low past return to result
in increased buying, which results in higher cumulative returns. We hypothesize that:

H 2 : A n i n c r e a s e in A S V I a m o n g s t o c k s w i t h h i g h i d i o s y n c r a t i c r i s k , l o w m a r k e t t o b o o k
r a t i o , a n d l o w p a s t r e t u r n r e s u l t s in p o s i t i v e a n d s i g n i f i c a n t c u m u l a t i v e r e t u r n s

SAMPLE AND DATA
The sample is comprised of all NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX listed firms that
announced open market repurchase announcements between 2004 and 2008. The
analysis starts in 2004 because it is the first year for which SVI data is available. It ends
in 2008 to allow studying the effect of the announcement on stock returns three years
following the announcement date. Similar to Da et al (2011), the American Deposit
Receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), limited
partnerships (LPs), and stocks below five dollars are excluded from the sample. Firms
that have announced accelerated repurchase announcements are excluded from this study.
Stock repurchase announcements are obtained from the Thomson One database. Firm
accounting data is obtained from COMPUSTAT and returns are obtained from CRSP.
Analyst data is obtained from I/B/E/S, news coverage is obtained from Factiva, and
Sentiment data is from Barron’s through Factiva. Closely held shares and the number of
common shares outstanding are obtained from Worlscope.
To be included in the sample, a firm must have complete information in Google
Trends, COMPUSTAT, CRSP, I/B/E/S, Factiva, and Worldscope databases. Of the 2,452
companies that announced open share repurchase announcements, 318 companies are
included in the study with a total of 49,600 firm-week observations.
Cumulative returns are calculated every week for up to three years following the
repurchase announcement. SVI reports are obtained through Google Trends at
fhttp://www.google.com/trends). In this study, SVI is obtained using each company’s
ticker symbol (Da et al 2011). The ticker symbol is used to capture the search logs that
are made for financial and investment purposes. It is also used to avoid accounting for
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searches that pertain to the companies’ products and services. For example, to obtain the
amount of searches done by investors interested in Bank o f America, we input its ticker
symbol “BAC” in Google trends instead of “Bank of America”. The use of the bank’s
name may include searches done by the bank’s customers instead of interested investors.
In addition, all SVI reports are obtained from the Finance Category in Google Trends to
reduce noise.
In this study, the Abnormal SVI (ASVI) for each week following the repurchase
announcement is used. To examine the impact o f Abnormal SVI on cumulative abnormal
returns, we follow Da et al (2011) method in using Fama-Macbeth (1973) regression for
panel data. We regress weekly cumulative returns on ASVI and control for other
attention proxies such as news coverage, turnover, analyst coverage, advertising
expenditures, and last week’s excess returns. Investor sentiment, measured using the
consumer confidence index and published by the Conference Board, is also used as a
control variable in this study. We also include other controls used in the share repurchase
literature. These are firm size, undervaluation m easured by the m arket to book ratio,

excess cash flow, excess debt capacity, ownership concentration, the size of the
repurchase program, and the number of times the same company announced a repurchase
program during the three years following the announcement.
To account for the effect of news on post-repurchase announcement returns, we use
Tetlock (2010) news variables; “News dummy” and “log (1 + log(number of news in the
last 52 weeks)”. Prior research indicates that the presence of news has a significant effect
on ASVI, and as a result on returns (Da et al 2011). In addition, the log of the number of
news reported in the last 52 weeks has a significant and negative relationship with ASVI.
This is expected because no abnormal attention is given to stocks that are widely covered.
Therefore, for each week following the repurchase announcement, we identify whether
news stories related to each firm have been reported. The dummy variable takes on the
value o f 1 if news concerning the company appears in the newswires that week and a
value o f 0 otherwise. News data is obtained from the Dow Jones archive, which
encompasses the Dow Jones News Service as well as the Wall Street Journal articles.
The Dow Jones archive is accessed through Factiva.
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Weekly trading volume is obtained from Compustat. Analyst coverage is measured
using the variable log(l+ # of analysts). The number of analysts is obtained from the
I/E/B/S database. Advertising expenditures are measured using last year’s ratio of
advertising expense to sales. Advertising and sales data are obtained from
COMPUSTAT. If a firm’s data is missing from the database, the ratio takes the value of
0. Another independent variable that is used is last week’s absolute excess returns.
A variable that has influential impact on retail investors’ attention is sentiment (Da et al
2011). Investor Sentiment is defined as “a belief about future cash flows and investment
risks that is not justified by the facts at hand.” Baker and Wurgler (2007, p. 129). It is
important to examine this variable because individual investors are more likely to be
affected by sentiment compared to institutional investors (Da et al 2011). We use the
American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) weekly sentiment measure. AAII
data was hand collected from Barron’s through Factiva. Investor sentiment is calculated
using the spread between the percentage o f bullish investors and bearish investors each
w eek (Brow n 2004).

We also use share repurchases literature controls. These include market
capitalization, market to book ratio, excess cash, debt to assets, ownership concentration
measured by closely held shares, size of the repurchase program, and the number of times
the repurchase announcement is made during the period of study. Table X-A presents the
variables used in the study and their definitions
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Table X-A
Variables Definition
Variable
SCAR
SVI
ASVI
News dummy or
Newsd
News
Trading volume
Analyst
Adv to sales

Xret
Sentiment
MKTcap
MB
Excess cash
Debt to assets
Closelyheld

Program size

Announce times
IR

Definition
Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Monthly Google's search volume index using each company’s ticker
symbol
Calculated using the (log) SVI during the current week minus the (log)
median SVI during the previous eight weeks
Takes the value of 1 if the company has news reported in the week in the
Dow Jones News Service and the Wall Street Journal; 0 otherwise
log (1 + log(number of news in the last 52 weeks)
Weekly trading volume obtained from Compustat
Calculated using log(l+ # of analysts). The number of analysts is
obtained from the I/E/B/S database
last year’s ratio of advertising expense to sales. Advertising and sales
data are obtained from COMPUSTAT. If a firm’s data is missing from
the database, the ratio takes the value of 0
last week’s absolute excess returns to the value weighted index
The American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) weekly
sentiment measure
the year-end log (market capitalization) prior to the announcement
Year-end market to book value ratio prior to the announcement
Compustat’s operating income after depreciation to total assets prior to
the repurchase announcement
Year-end ratio of total debt to total assets prior to the repurchase
announcement
Year-end ratio of closely held shares to the total number of common
stocks at the company’s year-end prior to the announcement. Data is
obtained from Worldscope
The ratio of the value of the buyback program to the year-end value of
common total equity prior to the repurchase announcement, expressed as
a percentage
The number of times the same company announced a repurchase
program during the three years following the announcement
Standard error of residuals in the Fama French three factor model
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RESULTS
Table X-B displays the summary statistics. Panel A shows the descriptive
statistics for the whole sample. Panel B gives descriptive statistics for firms with low
idiosyncratic risk and Panel C displays the results for firms with high idiosyncratic risk.
We can see that stocks with low idiosyncratic risk have slightly higher ASVI, higher
market capitalization, higher advertising expenses, more analyst coverage, higher trading
volume, higher market to book ratio, make more repurchase announcements, higher debt,
and have more news coverage compared to stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. Low
idiosyncratic firms tend to also make repurchase announcements during times with
positive sentiment. Firms with high idiosyncratic risk make repurchase announcements
during times characterized by negative sentiment.
On the other hand, stocks with high idiosyncratic risk have higher cumulative
returns, higher prior excess returns, more closely held shares, higher repurchase program
size, and higher excess cash.

Table X-B
Descriptive Statistics

Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the whole sample
Range

0.12871

Std Dev
1.054389

Median

SCAR

50552

Mean
0.1122

ASVI
Log market
cap
XRET

51324

0.003186

0

0.086261

51324

3.540039

3.568993

0.881031

2.109145
4.13109

51324
51324

0.034989
0.014392

0.021836

0.046589

2.355841

0

0.033133

0.322015

51324

0.257771

0.30103

0.241388

1.255273

Trading
Volume
Sentiment

51324

19.79639

5.738012

43.77001

958.9926

51324

0.887279

0.9

17.60135

107.6

MB
announ times

51324

3.237076

9.345449

51324

1.071817

212.857
7

51324

1.920973
0.207484

2.251
2
0.180272

0.19027

1.599878

51324

0.179327

0.121732

0.220211

1.702658

Variable

adv to sales
analyst

Debt to assets
closelyheld

N

24.2164

55

program size

51324

95.12553

14.48069

1001.9

15530.36

Excesscash

51324

0.107341

0.091006

0.093767

0.749614

news

51324

1.684787

1.633469

0.666394

3.863025

news dummy

51324

0.491505

0

0.501722

9

IR

51324

0.054722

0.0491

0.024721

0.2232

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for stocks with low idiosyncratic risk

Variable

N

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Range

SCAR

16619

0.06348

0.072359

0.90981

9.41378

ASVI

17114

0.003225

17114

4.009809

0.08188
0.749787

1.633469

Log market
cap
XRET

0
4.054024

3.865352

17114

0.020714

0.014869

0.020619

0.238994

adv to sales

17114

0.0168

0

0.043158

0.322015

analyst

17114

0.299819

0.30103

0.246574

1.255273

Trading
Volume
Sentiment
MB

17114

26.80179

9.227263

56.50214

880.0171

17114
17114

4.333248
3.68872

4.8
2.743

17.56832
15.54106

107.6
212.857

announ times

17114

2.475167

2

1.278219

7

Debt to assets
closelyheld

17114
17114

0.225921
0.107525

0.196981
0.037814

0.171447
0.148247

0.683427
1.1352

program size
Excesscash

17114

9.763087

14.01044

13798.9

17114

0.110443

0.08197

278.4333
0.104047

0.705612

17114
17114

1.907308
0.583674

1.869232
1

0.710281
0.498386

3.480295
9

news
news dummy

Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for stocks with high idiosyncratic risk
Variable

N

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Range

SCAR
ASVI

16676

0.181889

17143

0.00311

1.210754
0.089437

21.83687
2.109145

Log market
cap
XRET

17143

3.170043

0.175609
0
3.130262

0.82642

3.767566

17143

0.052297

0.033747

0.067116

2.35584

adv to sales
analyst
Trading
Volume
Sentiment

17143

0.014455

0

0.172483

17143
17143

0.230358
16.39409

0.30103
2.846451

0.027366
0.234822
39.37906

17143

-2.23538

-1.2

17.1013

MB

17143

3.32886

2.103

4.150611

98.3
32.744

announ times

17143

1.467538

1

0.717536

3

0.90309
958.9924

56

Debt to assets

17143

0.210862

0.180272

0.227314

1.599878

closelyheld

17143

0.227266

0.151981

0.219212

0.811141

program size

17143

149.7983

14.6008

1295.38

13689.58

Excesscash

17143

0.112995

0.104466

0.09136

0.476368

news

17143

1.537582

1.462398

0.60543

3.863025

news dummy

17143

0.415972

0

0.492903

1

Table XI reports the cumulative returns of stocks double sorted by ASVI and
different firm characteristics. Stocks are first sorted into terciles by size, market to book
ratio, past weekly return, price, illiquidity, and analyst coverage. Terciles 1 and 3 refer to
the lowest and highest value o f each characteristic, respectively. Each characteristicbased tercile is further sorted into three ASVI portfolios: no ASVI, low ASVI, and high
ASVI. Stocks with no ASVI are first identified. The remaining stocks are divided into
low and high ASV I groups using the m edian value o f ASVI. The cum ulative return o f

each portfolio is then computed.
Examining all stocks in the sample, the table shows that the average cumulative
return for stocks with no, low, and high ASVI are -0.07,0.08, and 0.09 respectively. The
difference in the average cumulative return between no ASVI and high ASVI stocks is 0.16, which is significant at the 1% level. The results show that, overall, stocks that
generate high ASVI earn higher cumulative returns.
Double sorting stocks by ASVI and size in panel A, we find that stocks that
generate high ASVI, regardless of size, earn significantly higher cumulative returns than
stocks with no ASVI. Small stocks with high ASVI generate the highest cumulative
returns compared to small stocks with no ASVI. Panels B shows that all stocks with high
ASVI earn higher returns than stocks with no ASVI. Stocks characterized by high ASVI
and low market to book ratio earn the highest cumulative returns compared to low market
to book ratio stocks with no ASVI. Panel C reports that all stocks with high ASVI,
regardless of their past return, earn significantly higher returns relative to stocks with no
ASVI. Panels D, E, and F support prior findings and show that stocks with high ASVI
earn higher cumulative returns than stocks with no ASVI. High ASVI stocks that are low
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priced, are highly illiquid, and with low analyst coverage earn the highest cumulative
returns.
Table XII examines the effect of ASVI on cumulative abnormal returns during the
first 4 weeks, 5 to 52 weeks, 53 to 104 weeks, and 105 to 156 weeks following the
announcement. It shows that, controlling for other attention measures, an increase in
ASVI in the first year following the repurchase announcement has a positive and
significant impact on cumulative returns. During the second and the third year, ASVI
shocks do not have a significant impact on returns.
The interaction between market cap and ASVI has a negative and significant
impact on cumulative returns during the first year. This suggests that the increase in
cumulative returns following shocks in attention is stronger for small firms. The table
also shows that firm size, measured by market capitalization, is negatively and
significantly related to cumulative returns from week 4 to the end o f the third year. This
indicates that smaller firms have stronger cumulative returns and the strongest post
repurchase stock price drift.
The table also shows that lagged absolute abnormal returns have a negative and
significant impact on cumulative returns during the first year following the
announcement. However, during the second and third year, an increase in lagged
absolute abnormal returns results in positive and significant impact on future cumulative
returns. Advertising expenses is another attention measure that is used as a control. We
see that it has a positive and significant effect on cumulative returns during the second
and third year following the repurchase announcement. Advertising has no significant
impact during the first year after the repurchase announcement. Analyst coverage and
trading volume are both attention measures that have a significant and positive impact on
returns during the first, second, and third year after the repurchase announcement. News
coverage has no significant effect on cumulative returns during the first year following
the repurchase announcement and a negative and significant impact during the second
and the third year.
Sentiment has a negative and significant impact on cumulative returns starting the
fourth week following the repurchase announcement. This suggests that a positive
increase in sentiment is likely to decrease future cumulative returns.
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A high market to book ratio is associated with negative future cumulative returns during
the first year. During the second and third year, market to book has a positive and
significant impact on returns. However, it is important to keep in mind that the
coefficient is very small. This suggests that value stocks have the strongest post
repurchase stock price drift.
The number of times a company makes a repurchase announcement after the
initial announcement accounted for in the study has significant effects on cumulative
returns. Table XII shows that an increase in the number of repurchase announcements
made during the first year following the initial announcement the study accounts for is
likely to have positive and significant effect on cumulative returns. However, it has a
negative and significant impact on returns during the second and the third year.
The higher the debt to assets ratio, the more likely the stock will experience
positive cumulative returns during the first, second and the third year. The higher a
company’s percentage of closely held shares, the more negative and significant the
impact is on cumulative returns following the repurchase announcement. However, the
higher the repurchase program size, the higher the cumulative returns during the three
years following the announcement. Finally, companies that hold excess cash and pay
their shareholders by engaging in repurchase programs are likely to incur negative
cumulative returns during the second year, but positive returns during the third year.
Prior evidence has shown that under-reaction following a repurchase
announcement can last up to three years for value stocks (Stephens and Weisbach (1998),
Ikenberry et al (2000), Jagannathan et al (2003), Chan et al (2004), and Chan et al
(2010)). Table XII shows that ASVI results in positive and significant cumulative returns
during the first year following the repurchase announcement and that value stocks with
high ASVI have the most significant and positive cumulative returns. As value stocks are
dominated by retail investors (Brandt et al (2009)), an increase in ASVI among these
stocks as a result of an increase in retail investors’ attention leads to buying, which in
turn results in higher price pressure and higher returns. ASVI, therefore, reduces
mispricing and accelerates the impounding of information following the repurchase
announcement among small stocks.
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Table XI
Abnormal Search Volume Index and Cumulative Returns: Univariate Comparisons
This table presents the cumulative returns of stocks with no, low, and high Abnormal Search Volume Index
(ASVI). Stocks are sorted into terciles by size, market to book ratio, past weekly return, price, illiquidity,
and analyst coverage. Terciles 1 and 3 refer to the lowest and highest value o f each characteristic,
respectively. Each characteristic-based tercile is further sorted into three ASVI portfolios: no ASVI, low
ASVI, and high ASVI. Stocks with no ASVI are first identified. The remaining stocks are divided into low
and high ASVI groups using the median value of ASVI. The cumulative return o f each portfolio is then
computed. The results are reported p=values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively
ASVI
No

t- Statistics

Low

High

No-High

P-value

No-High

No-High

All Stocks

-0.0735121

0.0827432 0.0928819 -0.1664***
Panel A: By Size

-16.23

(<.0001)

1

-0.2263958

0.0396213

0.0588854

-0.28***

-12.50

(<.0001)

2

0.0355774

0.1714139

0.1847463

-0.14***

-9.70

(<.0001)

3

-0.0295490

-0.05***
0.0283520 0.0261442
Panel B: By Market to Book

-3.98

(<.0001)

1

-0.1230634

0.1531669

0.1715438

-0.29***

-14.29

(<.0001)

2

-0.0322455

0.0985199

0.0960595

-0.12***

-8.92

(<.0001)

3

-0.0651711

-0.08***
0.000213531 0.0159545
Panel C: By Past Weekly Return

-4.50

(<0001)

1

-0.1187620

0.0596210

0.0718402

-0.190***

-10.13

(<0001)

2

-0.0545088

0.0856760

0.0605215

-0.115***

-6.93

(<0001)

3

-0.0578798

-0.205***
0.1010800 0.1474130
Panel D: By Price

-11.09

(<0001)

1

-0.2767978

0.0879406

0.0954320

-0.372***

-15.85

(<0001)

2

0.0107945

0.0847685

0.1115680

-0.10***

-7.17

(<.0001)

3

0.0292351

0.0757460 0.0705464 -0.0413***
Panel E: By Illiquiciity

-2.75

(0.0059)

1
2

-0.0203413

0.0825773

0.0907410

-0.11***

0.0329474

0.1173183

0.1213146

-0.088***

-6.64
-6.46

(<0001)
(<0001)

3

-0.2261452

-0.31***
0.0677560 0.0844814
Panel F: By Analyst Coverage

-14.16

(<0001)

1
2
3

-0.1536937
-0.0333731
-0.0103628

0.0948041
0.0501141
0.0996655

-14.69
-5.21
-6.81

(<0001)
(<0001)
(<0001)

0.1132155
0.0604299
0.1011391

-0.26***
-0.09***
-0.11***
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Table XII
ASVI and Returns following Repurchase Announcements
This table reports Fama Macbeth (1973) results. The dependent variable is the standardized cumulative
abnormal returns of stocks that have announced repurchase programs between 2004 and 2008 and for
which ASVI data is available. Cumulative abnormal returns are reported during the first 4 weeks after the
repurchase announcement, 5 to 52 weeks, 53 to 104 weeks, and 105 to 156 weeks following the
announcement. All independent variables are standardized. P-values are reported below the coefficients.

Week 1

Week 2

Week 3

Week 4

Week 5-52

Week 53-104

Week 105-156

-0.13253

0.148167

0.029184

0.088496

0.20734*

-0.00983

-0.01597

(0.6691)

(0.5003)

(0.8737)

(0.7444)

(0.0794)

(0.8041)

(0.5996)

Logmarketcap*ASVI

0.14789

-0.21859

-0.10258

-0.07752

-0.2397*

0.017114

0.013591

(0.3782)

(0.5966)

(0.6788)

-0.00601

-0.15***

-0.13***

(0.6535)
-0.10***

(0.9209)

(0.9537)

-0.10495
(0.2181)

(0.7605)
-0.217**

(0.0881)

zlogmarketcap

(0.6796)
0.01338

(0.0252)

(<.0001)

(<.0001)

(<.0001)

0.13441

0.042982

0.302921

0.038319

-0.047**

0.047***

0.0205**

(0.3301)

(0.6904)

(0.1058)

(0.8076)

(0.025)

(<.0001)

(0.0312)

-0.02032

-0.03247

-0.06916

0.00297

0.0178**

0.0231***

(0.7562)

(0.5456)

-0.05976
(0.3621)

(0.2954)

(0.6819)

(0.0186)

log analyst

0.02225
( 0 .7603 )

0.106605
(0.1111)

0.1123*
( 0 .0885 )

0.0355***
( 0 .0005 )

0.055***
(<.0001)

volume

-0.2066*

-0.272**

-0.04655

0.1638**
(0.018)
-0.04741

0.0657***

0.083***

(0.0023)
0.0278***
(0.0012)
0.1145***

sentiment

(0.0864)
-0.00285

(0.0213)
-0.11**

(0.4861)
-0.03471

(0.4341)
-0.096*

(0.0007)
-0.06***

(<.0001)
-0.078***

(<.0001)
0.0323***

(0.9657)

(0.0213)

(0.4707)

(0.0501)

(<.0001)

(<.0001)

(<.0001)

-0.02874

-0.0352

-0.0486*

-0.02021

-0.008*

1.62E-02***

-0.011***

(0.5381)

(0.2743)

(0.0853)

(0.532)

(0.0908)

(0.0004)

-0.02788
(0.6644)

0.020884

0.070322

0.045***

-0.01855**

(0.715)

0.060385
(0.3317)

(0.0079)
-0.077***

(0.2535)

(0.038)

-0.02986

0.010295

0.050808

0.069317

(<.0001)
0.0184**

(0.6724)

(0.8397)

(0.3461)

(0.1634)

(0.022)

0.126**

0.01822

0.012606

0.016592

(0.0447)

(0.721)
0.043174

(0.8016)

ASVI

XRET
Adv to sales

MB
announc times
debt to assets
closelyheld
program size
excess cash
news
news dummy
Obs
R square

0.083446

0.0583***

(<.0001)
0.0457***

-0.079***

(<.0001)
-0.131***

(<.0001)
-0.165***

(<.0001)

(<.0001)

0.009931

(0.6993)
0.044107

0.0132*

0.02***

(<.0001)
0.084***

(0.0948)

(0.2939)

(0.3066)

(0.7319)

(0.3078)

(0.0082)

(<.0001)

-0.0276

-0.07101
(0.1952)

-0.085*
(0.0759)

-3.71E-03
(0.6447)

-0.012*
(0.0996)

0.014*

(0.6175)

-0.06531
(0.2211)

-0.05512
(0.6576)

0.006843
(0.9423)

-0.00883
(0.93)

0.152708
(0.1271)

-0.01665

-0.029**

(0.2283)

(0.0353)

-0.025**
(0.0454)

0.087611

0.133926
(0.3217)

-0.18933

-0.08***

(0.2158)

-0.02426
(0.2141)

-0.088***

(0.5931)

-0.01335
(0.927)

(<.0001)

(<.0001)

318
0.0595

318
0.0662

318

318
0.0612

15264
0.0239

16536
0.0406

16528
0.0501

0.0814

(0.0907)
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Table XIII investigates the effect of ASVI on cumulative returns controlling for
different proxies of limits to arbitrage. In Table XIII, we examine the effect of ASVI on
cumulative returns given different levels of idiosyncratic risk, market to book ratio, and
past week return. First, we group stocks into quintiles based on investor attention. We
then select the top and bottom quintiles and sort stocks in each quintile based on the level
o f idiosyncratic risk, market to book ratio, and past week return. We, then, examine the
effect o f ASVI on cumulative returns for these portfolios, controlling for the independent
variables included in regression in Table XII. Table XIII reports the coefficients of ASVI
on cumulative returns.
Panels A, B and C show that high ASVI results in positive and significant effect
on cumulative returns among stocks characterized by high idiosyncratic risk, low market
to book ratio, and low past week return. The results are significant at the 1% level and
confirm the findings in Table XII. ASVI accelerates the impounding of the repurchase
information in stocks that are highly mispriced. These stocks are dominated by retail
investors and an increase in ASVI results in increased buying, w hich pushes returns

higher and reduces mispricing. The findings are in line with the predictions of the
attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008).
The table shows mixed results on the effect of ASVI on stocks that tend to be less
mispriced. The effect of high ASVI is negative and significant on stocks with low
idiosyncratic risk at the 10% level (Panel A), negative though insignicant for high market
to book stocks (Panel B), and positive and significant at the 1% level among stocks with
high past week return (Panel C).
Table XIII also reports the effects of ASVI on cumulative returns among stocks
with low ASVI. It shows that ASVI results in negative returns among all stocks with low
ASVI. This can be explained by the fact that the stocks in the lowest ASVI quintile have
negative ASVI. Such stocks suffer from reduced investor attention compared to previous
weeks. The reduction in investor attention results in less buying, which reduces price
pressure and results in negative returns. The attention hypothesis postulates that
inattention results in under-reaction. The results reported in Table XIII regarding stocks
with low ASVI support this prediction.
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Table XIII
The effect of ASVI on Cumulative Returns during the first year following the
repurchase announcement
The table reports of the effect of ASVI on cumulative returns, during the first year following the repurchase
announcement and controlling for the variables listed in Table XII. The results are presented by
subsamples of idiosyncratic risk, market to book ratio and past week return. The dependent variable is the
standardized cumulative abnormal returns of stocks that have announced repurchase programs between
2004 and 2008 and for which ASVI data is available. The table gives results across portfolios constructed
based on abnormal attention (ASVI) and idiosyncratic risk (IR). IR is calculated using the model Ri(t) Rf(t) = a + pl(Rm(t) - Rf(t)) + p2SMB(t) + p3HML(t) + £i(t). IR is the standard deviation of the error
term. The results are reported and p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively

ASVI Portfolio
High

Low

Panel A: By Idiosyncratic Risk (IR)
Low
-0.32102*
-0.50186**
(0.0405)

-0.36604*
(0.0595)
-0.66388***
(0.0007)

(0.0646)
Medium
0.15903
(0.2076)
High
1.21214***
(<.0001)

Panel B: By Market to Book
Low
0.93605***
-0.76695***
(<.0001)
(<.0001)

-0.00561
(0.9777)
-0.06596
( 0.7771)

Medium
-0.07797
(0.6275)
High
-0.00311
(0.9828 )

Panel C: By Past Week Return

-0.37668*
(0.0634)

Low
1.16164***
(<.0001)
Medium
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-0.04995
(0.7782)
-0.72771***
(0.0006)

-0.17068
(0.1863)
High
0.74410***
(<.0001)

SUMMARY
In this paper, we set out to study the effect of investor attention on the stock price
repurchases drift. We find that investor attention, measured by Google’s ASVI, results in
positive cumulative returns one year after the repurchase announcement. The results are
driven by small stocks, stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, stocks with low market to
book ratio, and stocks with low past return. Prior research has shown that for such
stocks, the repurchase drift lasts for three years due to limits to arbitrage. As these stocks
are dominated by retail investors, an increase in retail investors’ attention as measured by
ASVI results in increased buying, which pushes prices and cumulative returns higher. A
decrease in ASVI is caused by investors’ inattention, which causes negative cumulative
returns. We conclude that an increase in ASVI accelerates the impounding of the
repurchase announcement into the prices of stocks that tend to be mispriced. The findings
in this paper provide further support to the attention hypothesis.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis sought to investigate the impact of investor attention, as measured by
SVI, on the expected returns of EREITs and the open market repurchases post
announcement returns. Essay 1 shows that investor attention has a significant impact on
EREITs returns. More specifically, EREITs that attract high investor attention, as
measured by SVI, generate higher returns than EREITs with no investor attention. The
univariate analysis shows that average returns are especially higher for the EREITs that
are small, with high book to market ratio, low past month return, low price, and are
highly illiquid. Controlling for different risk factors, we find that increased investor
attention results in higher average returns among stocks that are small and with high book
to market ratio. We also report that the SVI effect is not spurious. The positive and
significant effect of SVI on stocks is not driven by impediments to trade. Rather, the SVI
effect is due to improvement in investor recognition. SVI improves investor recognition
among stocks that suffer from poor information dissemination and high information
incompleteness, which results in high returns. This lends support to the Attention
hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) and Merton’s (1987) investor recognition
hypothesis.
Essay 2 shows that abnormal investor attention, as measured by ASVI, results in
positive and significant cumulative returns in the stocks of firms that have made
repurchase announcements. The univariate analysis shows that ASVI has the largest and
most significant impact on the stocks that are small, with low market to book ratio, are
low priced, are more illiquid and are with low analyst coverage. The multivariate analysis
shows that ASVI results in positive and significant returns during the first year following
the repurchase announcement. The analysis also shows that the results are driven by
small stocks. Further analysis indicates that high ASVI results in positive and significant
effect on cumulative returns during the first year following the announcement among
stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, low market to book ratio, and low past return. Prior
studies have documented that such stocks under-react to the repurchase announcement
for up to three years due to limits to arbitrage. We conclude that abnormal retail investor
attention, as measured by Google’s ASVI, increases buying among stocks that suffer
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from limits to arbitrage. ASVI, therefore, reduces mispricing and results in the
impounding of the repurchase announcement information into stock prices. This is in
line with the predictions of the investor attention hypothesis.
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